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INDIAN COUNTRY’S BORDERS: 
TERRITORIALITY, IMMUNITY, 
AND THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 
Katherine J. Florey* 
Abstract: This Article explores the consequences of an anomaly in the 
Supreme Court’s Indian law jurisprudence. In the past few decades, the 
Court has sharply limited the regulatory powers of tribal governments 
and the jurisdiction of tribal courts while leaving intact the sovereign im-
munity that tribes have traditionally enjoyed. The result has been that 
tribes can avoid the effects of otherwise-applicable state and federal law, 
while at the same time they lack any affirmative powers to regulate events 
within their territory. This Article argues that this state of affairs is unten-
able. This Article first suggests that for tribes to exist as effective govern-
ments, their sovereign authority must have a territorial component. The 
Article then discusses the undesirable consequences of tribal sovereign 
immunity, including a lack of government accountability, increased un-
certainty about the law’s reach, and inadequate compensation for tort vic-
tims. Ultimately, this Article concludes that, although it may be tempting 
for tribal advocates to embrace tribal sovereign immunity when the Su-
preme Court seems disinclined to preserve other elements of tribal sov-
ereignty, relying on immunity as the cornerstone of sovereignty would be 
a mistake. Instead, tribes should take steps to strengthen the territorial 
component of their sovereign status. 
Introduction 
 This Article takes as its starting point two commonly told narratives 
about outsiders in Indian country. The first—perhaps the most famil-
iar—is the story of the blameless tourist who visits a tribal casino and, as 
a result of the casino’s negligent conduct, suffers a terrible injury. Fac-
ing lost work time and steep medical bills, she seeks to sue the casino 
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for redress. To her astonishment, however, she learns that the casino is 
shielded by the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. Basic tort protec-
tions are entirely unavailable. Instead, she is left with only a makeshift 
proceeding before an unfriendly tribal court or, perhaps, no remedy at 
all.1 
 The second story, though less frequently heard by the general pub-
lic, is well known to those who live and work in Indian country. This is 
the story of the non-Indian troublemaker—someone who is not a 
member of the tribe, but has family members or property on the reser-
vation, or has simply found the reservation a convenient place to en-
gage in criminal activities.2 This person poses a serious threat to the 
safety and security of tribe members. He might sell methamphetamine, 
drive while intoxicated, assault tribal police officers—perhaps all of the 
above.3 Even though all of these activities take place on tribal land, the 
tribe is powerless because it lacks criminal jurisdiction over nonmem-
bers, and federal authorities may be uninterested in filling the void.4 
Thus, the tribe has little choice but to allow its territory to be used as a 
haven for criminal activity. 
 These stories—both told repeatedly in the media, in courts, and at 
congressional hearings—encapsulate the perplexities of modern tribal 
sovereignty.5 Of course, as Justice Marshall’s famously contradictory 
description of tribes as “domestic dependent nations” might suggest,6 
the precise definition of the sovereignty tribes enjoy within the United 
States has long been an uneasy matter. In the past few decades, how-
ever, the contradictions surrounding the meaning of tribal sovereignty 
have become more acute. 
                                                                                                                      
1 See infra notes 282–297 and accompanying text. 
2 See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 (1978) (describing 
non-Indians arrested on tribal territory); see also Gary Fields, Tattered Justice: On U.S. Indian 
Reservations, Criminals Slip Through Gaps—Limited Legal Powers Hobble Tribal Nations; Feds Take 
Few Cases, Wall St. J., June 12, 2007, at A1. 
3 See, e.g., Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194 (noting the arrest of one non-Indian petitioner for 
assaulting a police officer and of another for engaging in a high-speed car race). 
4 See Ann E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between the Constitution, the Marshall Trilogy, and 
United States v. Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next Legislative Restoration of Tribal Sover-
eignty, 42 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 651, 691 (2009) (discussing plight of tribes relying on fed-
eral prosecutors for crime control and noting that “U.S. Attorneys decline to prosecute 
approximately 85% of felony cases referred to them by tribal prosecutors”). 
5 See Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Un-
der Federal Law, 37 Tulsa L. Rev. 661, 731–33 (2002) (discussing the testimony at congres-
sional hearings); infra notes 283–301 and accompanying text (discussing media accounts 
of lawsuits involving Indian reservations). 
6 See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (suggesting that tribes 
“may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations”). 
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 On the one hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has systematically 
stripped tribes of the one attribute that is—perhaps above all else— 
associated with sovereign status: the power to assert control over events 
that take place on one’s own territory.7 The territorial element of tribal 
sovereignty has never been simple, largely because courts have long 
employed a strikingly narrow conception of what constitutes tribal ter-
ritory.8 For tribes, the power to regulate has long been based not on 
traditional geopolitical boundaries but on the tribal ownership status of 
particular parcels of land—a highly unorthodox way to conceive of sov-
ereign power over territory.9 Moreover, tribal land holdings themselves 
have, over the years, been reduced from their historical levels by ill-
conceived government programs and financial pressures.10 
 But even setting aside these long-standing problems, tribes’ ability 
to govern their own territory has come under renewed assault in the 
past few decades. Increasingly, the Court has shifted the basis of tribal 
powers from tribal land ownership to tribal membership, meaning that 
tribes effectively lack power to regulate the activities of nonmembers— 
including nonmembers who live on the reservation and strangers 
within tribal territory—even when those activities take place on tribal 
land.11 Thus, tribes are largely unable to perform the most basic func-
tions of government: policing their borders and keeping their citizens 
safe from harm. The safety and security of tribal lands are instead at the 
mercy of federal and state courts and police. 
 This judicial erosion of tribal sovereignty in recent years is a well-
known development, and the shift it represents in the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence has been much debated and criticized.12 Somewhat less 
discussed, however, is the increasing importance of a parallel facet of 
tribal sovereignty: the immunity tribes enjoy from suit in state and fed-
eral courts. In sharp contrast to the aggressive curbs it has placed on 
tribal territorial powers, the Court has left the traditionally robust doc-
                                                                                                                      
7 See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195. 
8 See infra notes 44–68 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 44–68 and accompanying text. To conceptualize the plight of tribes, 
imagine a world in which state laws—from prohibitions on murder to environmental regu-
lations—applied only within the boundaries of state parks and government buildings and 
could be freely ignored by citizens on privately owned land. 
10 See infra notes 116–131 and accompanying text. 
11 See Philip Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of 
Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 Yale L.J. 1 (1999). 
12 See, e.g., id.; David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of 
the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1573 (1996). 
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trine of tribal immunity more or less intact,13 and Congress has likewise 
rejected calls to use its plenary power over Indian affairs to narrow the 
doctrine.14 As a result, tribal immunity is one of the few traditional sov-
ereign prerogatives that tribes retain with full force. 
 To put it this way, however, understates the importance immunity 
has to modern tribal sovereignty. That is, though tribal immunity has a 
long history, it has evolved from being a peripheral feature of tribal 
sovereignty to a central one—perhaps the central one when it comes to 
tribal relationships with nonmembers. This is true in part because tribal 
gaming and other enterprises, which often share in the tribe’s immu-
nity, have expanded into multimillion-dollar operations with the usual 
legal problems of large businesses, making tribal immunity a more po-
tent and widely useful tool than it has ever been.15 Perhaps an even 
more important reason for the increasing importance of tribal immu-
nity, however, is the shrinking of tribal territorial powers. As tribes’ abil-
ity to exercise sovereign control in other arenas has decreased, the 
natural tendency has been for tribes to assert their sovereign immunity 
as forcefully as possible.16 Because tribal immunity essentially permits 
tribes to avoid suit entirely if they so choose, this immunity can be use-
ful leverage in transactions over which tribes normally have little regu-
latory power. Further, there are relatively few constraints on tribes’ abil-
ity to make broad assertions of the immunity they possess.17 Where 
states and other sovereigns may be subject to political pressure to waive 
                                                                                                                      
13 See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1988). 
14 See id.; Seielstad, supra note 5, at 666 (describing failure of legislation that would 
have limited tribal immunity). 
15 See, e.g., Cook v. AVI Casino Enters., Inc., 548 F.3d 718, 725 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]ribal 
corporations acting as an arm of the tribe enjoy the same sovereign immunity granted to a 
tribe itself.”). 
16 Native Am. Distrib. v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 491 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (N.D. Okla. 
2007) (providing an example of this phenomenon). 
17 See Cook, 548 F.3d at 725. It has sometimes been argued that market pressures also 
serve to limit contractual assertions of immunity by any sovereign, because contracting part-
ners will often demand a waiver of sovereign immunity as a condition of entering into a deal; 
this may be true to some extent in the tribal context as well. See Felix S. Cohen, Cohen’s 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 21.02[2] (rev. ed. 2005) (“Tribes, like governments 
generally, have used limited waivers of tribal immunity as means of stimulating economic 
development.”). In other circumstances, however, those entering into contracts with tribes 
may be less familiar with the contours of tribal sovereign immunity—particularly when the 
immunity status of a tribal corporation is unclear—and are therefore less likely to demand 
complete and effective waivers. See Patrice H. Kunesh, Tribal Self-Determination in the Age of 
Scarcity, 54 S.D. L. Rev. 398, 404 (2009) (noting that, in the tribal context, “the rules of sover-
eign immunity can be difficult to discern because sovereign entities necessarily must act 
through individual officers and agents”). 
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sovereign immunity to permit at least some suits by their own citizens, 
tribal immunity may be most useful when it is asserted against outsiders 
who have little political influence with the tribe.18 Moreover, state and 
federal courts have sometimes been sympathetic to broad assertions of 
tribal sovereign immunity.19 Indeed, for judges who would prefer not to 
intervene in delicate issues of state-tribal relations or to decide compli-
cated questions of tribal law, tribal immunity may be a welcome avoid-
ance tactic.20 
 These two directions in the judicial approach to tribal power, 
though much remarked-upon individually, have rarely been considered 
together.21 This Article argues that the trends of reduced territoriality 
and increased immunity are best understood in tandem, because both 
have served to change the underlying meaning of tribal sovereignty. The 
shift from territoriality to immunity has resulted in a construction of 
tribal sovereignty that is almost entirely negative—conferring the ability 
to avoid the effects of otherwise-applicable state and federal law, while at 
the same time denying affirmative powers to regulate events within 
tribal territory. Furthermore, the changing role of tribal territoriality 
has changed perceptions of tribal immunity (and vice versa). For exam-
ple, the diminution of tribal sovereignty in its more traditionally territo-
rial aspects has increased the controversy surrounding the assertion of 
tribal immunity.22 Because nonmembers who deal with tribes may see 
few outward indications that tribes possess the traditional trappings of 
                                                                                                                      
18 For example, to the extent tribal immunity is used as a forum-shifting device by the 
tribe to ensure that disputes may be heard in tribal court, it is most useful in suits involving 
nonmembers, over whom the tribal courts would normally otherwise lack jurisdiction. 
Tribes may also acutely desire to avoid suits by nonmembers, who may have more re-
sources to invest in litigation than tribe members and who may be less amenable to non-
judicial forms of redress. 
19 See Cook, 548 F.3d at 725−26 (citing cases). 
20 For one example of this phenomenon, see Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 305 
F.3d 1015, 1027 (9th Cir. 2002) (dismissing a difficult case involving the legality of state-
tribal gaming compacts in light of the importance of respecting tribal immunity). 
21 See, e.g., Seielstad, supra note 5, at 704 (“While a full analysis of this incongruence in 
the Court’s jurisprudence [between its treatment of immunity and other aspects of tribal 
sovereignty] goes beyond the scope of this Article, the Court’s preservation of the doctrine 
of tribal immunity is noteworthy.”). But see Catherine Struve, Tribal Immunity and Tribal 
Courts, 36 Ariz. St. L.J. 137, 137 (2004) (“One of the ironies of federal Indian law is that 
the Supreme Court has stripped tribes of many of the positive aspects of governmental 
authority . . . while leaving intact a negative power: the power to avoid liability through the 
assertion of sovereign immunity from suit.”). 
22 For a discussion of the public controversy that often attends assertions of tribal im-
munity, see infra notes 264–322 and accompanying text. 
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sovereignty, they are likely to be unpleasantly surprised at the knowledge 
that tribes nonetheless enjoy immunity from suit. 
 On one level, it is logical for tribal advocates to embrace tribal sov-
ereign immunity in an era when the Court seems disinclined to pre-
serve other elements of tribal sovereignty. In some circumstances, it is 
almost certainly desirable. At the same time, reliance on immunity as 
the cornerstone of sovereignty may be perilous for tribes. This Article 
argues that the shift from territory to immunity is fundamentally unde-
sirable, for tribes as well as for nonmembers who have dealings with 
them. First, immunity is not a substitute for territorial power. Although 
immunity may protect tribes in certain dealings with nonmembers, it 
does not allow tribes to maintain fully effective governments or to pre-
scribe the law that will apply to their communities. Moreover, territorial 
power represents a stand in favor of tribal autonomy and against the 
colonialist and assimilationist policies that have, throughout U.S. his-
tory, attempted to separate tribes from their land.23 To relinquish all 
territorial aspects of tribal power would be, in many ways, to abandon 
the most important facets of tribal sovereignty. 
 Second, excessive reliance on sovereign immunity has disadvan-
tages in itself. Tribal immunity, though exceptional in certain ways, is, at 
least to some extent, subject to the many criticisms that have been lev-
eled against sovereign immunity in other contexts. For example, it di-
minishes accountability, fosters uncertainty about the law’s reach, and 
inadequately compensates genuinely injured tort victims.24 
 In most ways, the fact that tribes have come to rely increasingly on 
immunity is a matter of necessity, not choice. Tribes did not decide to 
cash in their traditional sovereign prerogatives in exchange for preser-
vation of their sovereign immunity; they have simply made the best of a 
bad hand. Recent cases give not the slightest indication that the Su-
preme Court would be willing to reconsider its membership-based con-
ception of tribal sovereignty to permit tribes more territorial control.25 
Thus, the current territoriality/immunity balance is, as a matter of doc-
trine, likely to remain with tribes at least for the immediate future. 
 Nonetheless, this Article argues that there are ways in which tribes 
can strengthen the territorial component of their sovereign status in 
                                                                                                                      
23 Katherine Florey, Choosing Tribal Law: Why State Choice-of-Law Principles Should Apply to 
Disputes with Tribal Contacts, 55 Am. U. L. Rev. 1627, 1635–37 (2006) (discussing the poli-
cies of allotment and termination). 
24 See infra notes 268–272 and accompanying text. 
25 See e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709 
(2008); Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005). 
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ways compatible with existing law. These steps, many of them quite 
modest, include everything from devices that call greater attention to 
the physical borders of reservations to increased use of tribes’ power to 
expel undesirables from tribal lands through banishment or exclusion 
orders. For example, tribes can strengthen territorial sovereignty by 
using sovereign immunity as a bargaining chip to secure tribal jurisdic-
tion over on-reservation disputes. Increased emphasis on tribal control 
of tribal territory could, in turn, have the beneficial side effect of miti-
gating some of the harsher aspects of tribal sovereign immunity. In-
forming nonmembers that tribal borders are significant, for example, 
will diminish the surprise when they realize that different legal rules 
apply to their dealings in Indian country.26 Thus, even within the severe 
constraints of the Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence, mechanisms 
exist to enhance the territorial footing of current tribal sovereignty. 
 In making this argument, this Article proceeds in three parts. Part 
I describes the ongoing loss of tribes’ control over their territories.27 
Part II then details the parallel increase in sovereign immunity’s impor-
tance.28 Part III explores the consequences of these developments.29 In 
criticizing the status quo, this Part looks first to the literature of territo-
riality and sovereignty to suggest that for tribes to exist as effective gov-
ernments, their sovereign authority must have a territorial component. 
This Part then draws on various critiques of sovereign immunity in 
other contexts to argue that tribal sovereign immunity has some simi-
larly undesirable consequences. Finally, Part IV concludes by arguing 
that tribal immunity is not a substitute for territorial control, and ex-
plores ways in which tribes can work to strengthen the territorial di-
mension of their sovereignty.30 
I. The Erosion of the Border: Ownership,  
Membership, and Sovereignty 
 For the most part, tribal borders are unobtrusive. A visitor crossing 
onto a reservation is most likely to encounter something like the faded, 
arrowhead-shaped sign that reads, “Entering San Carlos Apache Indian 
                                                                                                                      
26 The protections of tribal sovereign immunity are not limited to tribes’ on-reservation 
activities. Nonetheless, many more occasions exist for nonmember disputes with tribes to 
arise on the reservation rather than off of it. 
27 See infra notes 31–111 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 112–215 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 216–322 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 323–436 and accompanying text. 
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Reservation.”31 A few signs provide detailed historical or cultural in-
formation.32 A handful of tribes make passing reference to tribal sover-
eignty or tribal law in their border markers, such as “Entering the Sov-
ereign Nation of the Morongo Band of Mission Indians.”33 The sign 
marking the entrance to the Pala Indian Reservation welcomes visitors 
to the reservation while counseling them that “[b]y entering this reser-
vation you agree to abide by Federal, State, Tribal, and County Laws.”34 
For the most part, however, reservation border signs do little to alert a 
visitor to the fact that she is entering what is, under some views, a for-
eign nation. Tribal casinos and resorts—even though sometimes high-
lighting tribal culture or history—may likewise have few reminders for 
visitors of the separate, sovereign status of the land on which they are 
located.35 
 In many ways, this inattention to border markers reflects the reality 
of current law. The unobtrusiveness of reservation borders is both an 
explanation for and a corollary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Indian law 
jurisprudence of the last fifty years, which has made identity of parties, 
rather than location, the basis for tribal jurisdiction in both its adjudica-
tive and regulatory aspects. In other words, crossing a tribal border, 
particularly for a nonmember, is only rarely a legally significant act.36 
 This de-emphasis on tribal borders has a long history. For many 
years, the question of the territorial scope of tribal authority has been a 
perplexing one, in which the issues of governmental control over terri-
                                                                                                                      
31 See Regeneration Reservation, http://www.regenerationreservation.org/images/reg/ 
culture/sign.jpg (last visited Apr. 29, 2010); see also Human Rights Now, http://blog.am- 
nestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/img_6852.jpg (last visited Apr. 29, 2010) (sign 
reading simply “Entering Standing Rock Indian Reservation”). Some border markers are even 
more modest; a small sign reading “Crow Indian Reservation Boundary” attached to a fence-
post would scarcely be noticeable by a driver without sharp eyesight. See Posting of sheridangal 
to http://outdoors.webshots.com/photo/1017021902026266494tRuxLGDhSs ( July 8, 2001). 
32 See Posting of I used to be a coyote to http://www.flickr.com/photos/45637686@N00/ 
1882933242 (Nov. 2, 2007) (Fort Belknap reservation sign providing detailed historical back-
ground). 
33 See Electronic Educational Environment, https://eee.uci.edu/clients/tcthorne/Hist15/ 
quasisovereignty.htm (last visited May 3, 2010). 
34 See Photograph (on file with author); see also Posting of Robin Beck to http:// 
tiny.cc/z58Ag (2009) (Quileute Indian Reservation sign stating “Please obey all Laws, Or-
dinances, and Customs”); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 193 n.2 
(1978) (“Notices were placed in prominent places at the entrances to the Port Madison 
Reservation informing the public that entry onto the Reservation would be deemed im-
plied consent to the criminal jurisdiction of the Suquamish tribal court”). 
35 This conclusion is drawn from the author’s personal observations of tribal casinos 
and casino advertising. 
36 See infra notes 323–340 and accompanying text (detailing the few exceptions to this 
principle). 
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tory and land ownership status have been intertwined.37 Normally, the 
ownership status of land bears little relationship to the ability of the 
relevant sovereign to assert its authority. A homeowner in California cer-
tainly cannot claim exemption from state tax or freedom from the juris-
diction of California courts simply because she owns her land in fee 
simple. In the case of tribes, however, the fact of initial colonization—
and subsequent waves of state and federal hostility toward the idea of 
reservations as autonomous governments—has complicated from the 
start the relationship between political territory and ownership.38 
 Moreover, in the past several decades, the Court has compounded 
this problem by shifting away from land as a basis of tribal jurisdiction 
altogether. Instead, the Court increasingly looks at tribal sovereignty 
through the lens of consent.39 For the most part, therefore, tribes cur-
rently possess jurisdiction over those who have agreed to it, either im-
plicitly through tribal membership or explicitly through contract. Al-
though the Court has occasionally recognized a minor continuing role 
for tribal land status, even tribal ownership of land generally does not 
confer jurisdiction itself.40 Both of these trends have been highly detri-
mental to tribal territorial control. The following section explores these 
developments and their consequences. 
A. Beginnings: Sovereignty as Possession 
 Despite many unusual attributes of tribal lands, the notion of tribal 
control over discrete geographical areas is well-entrenched. From the 
earliest days of the United States, tribes were considered to occupy dis-
tinct areas of land, the boundaries of which were set by treaty.41 During 
the first half of the nineteenth century, tribes were forcibly resettled in 
the area west of the Mississippi River, which was not organized into U.S. 
states at that time.42 In the 1850s, the federal government began to set 
aside reservations for tribes within the boundaries of existing states.43 
 For many years, exactly what rights tribes retained to land they oc-
cupied was unclear. The foundational 1823 Supreme Court case of John-
                                                                                                                      
37 See infra notes 41–74 and accompanying text. 
38 This hostility is reflected in the U.S. government’s policy of allotment. See infra notes 
49–55 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 75–101 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 75–101 and accompanying text. 
41 See William C. Canby Jr., American Indian Law 106 (2004). 
42 See id. at 14. The area then called the Indian Territory now constitutes the states of 
Oklahoma and Kansas. 
43 See id. at 18. 
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son v. M’Intosh was the first to clarify the unique status of tribal lands, 
holding that although tribes had the right to possess and occupy lands 
they had traditionally asserted sovereignty over, the United States re-
tained “absolute ultimate title.”44 Subsequently, in its 1831 decision, 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Court clarified that the relationship of the 
United States to tribes in the administration of trust land was essentially 
that of ward to trustee.45 Many subsequent cases have greatly fleshed out 
the notion of the trust relationship that exists between the United States 
and tribes with respect to management of tribal land, as well as the 
remedies tribes have for breaches of trust duties.46 The existence of the 
trust relationship means that tribes receive some benefits from the 
United States in exchange for a relationship of formal dependency; 
tribes remain, nonetheless, the beneficial owners of the land.47 It should 
also be noted that not all tribal land is trust land; some tribes have pur-
chased lands in fee simple, while others (such as the Pueblos of New 
Mexico) have fee simple title acquired from Spain.48 
 The land status of reservations became more complicated with the 
policy of allotment, instituted in the late nineteenth century, not long 
after the reservations had been established.49 Under the policy of al-
lotment, reservations were, by a series of federal statutes, carved into 
individual parcels apportioned to individual tribe members, to be held 
in trust for a period of twenty-five years before becoming fee land.50 
Non-allotted reservation lands were sometimes opened for settlement 
by non-Indians.51 Allotment was an assimilationist policy, designed to 
                                                                                                                      
44 See 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587−88 (1823). 
45 See 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). The Court observed: 
[Tribes] may, . . . perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. 
They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, 
which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession 
ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United 
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian. 
Id. 
46 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 228 (1983); United States v. Mitchell, 
445 U.S. 535, 546 (1980); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 308 (1942); 
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383−84 (1886); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 
101 Ct. Cl. 10, 1944 WL 3683, at *7 (1944). 
47 See Cohen, supra note 17, § 5.04[4][a] (describing the modern trust relationship). 
48 See id. § 15.04[5]. 
49 See Canby, supra note 41, at 21–22 (noting that the first within-state reservations 
were established in 1851 and the first efforts at allotment began in 1854). 
50 See General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24. Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. § 348 (2006)); Frickey, supra note 11, at 15. 
51 See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 467 (1984). 
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break up reservations and turn tribe members into farmers.52 The pro-
gram was, however, a famous and spectacular failure, resulting in many 
allotments ending up in non-Indian hands (often involuntarily through 
foreclosures), and the policy was ended by the Indian Reorganization 
Act of 1934.53 
 In the years since allotment, tribes have sought to regain title to 
some allotted land through repurchase by the tribe or the Department 
of the Interior, but much of it remains alienated from tribal control.54 
To enter a reservation is thus frequently to encounter a mixture of 
never-alienated Indian trust land, Indian-owned allotments, and former 
allotted land now owned by nonmembers who may have little or no 
connection with—or sympathy for—the tribe.55 
 The fact that not all land on reservations is owned by tribes or 
their members has led to a second problem: what is the relationship 
between tribal ownership of land (or the lack thereof) and tribal politi-
cal control over territory? That is, can tribes assert jurisdiction over 
land they do not possess? For many years, this was something of an 
open question.56 The term “Indian country” has long been used to de-
note territories under tribal control, but its meaning has changed over 
time. “Indian country” was first used in the nineteenth century to refer 
to the western territories to which tribes were consigned;57 this defini-
tion was later expanded by a series of judicial decisions clarifying that 
Indian country could include, for example, land within the boundaries 
of the state and land that was not held pursuant to aboriginal title.58 In 
general, however, it was the case that Indian lands consisted primarily 
of “lands in which the Indians held some form of property interest: 
                                                                                                                      
52 See Frickey, supra note 11, at 15. 
53 See Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 383, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2006); Frickey, supra note 11, at 15.. 
54 See Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation, Reparations, and Restitution: Indian Property Claims 
in the United States, 28 Ga. L. Rev. 453, 476−77 (1994) (describing tribal land-acquisition pro-
grams). 
55 See Frickey, supra note 11, at 15. 
56 See Cohen, supra note 17, § 3.04[2][b]. 
57 See Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834, ch. 151, § 1, 4 Stat. 729 (1834). The Act de-
fined “Indian country” as: 
[A]ll that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not within the 
states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of Arkansas, and, also, that 
part of the United States east of the Mississippi [R]iver, and not within any 
state to which the Indian title has not been extinguished . . . . 
Id. 
58 See Cohen, supra note 17, § 3.04[2][b] (discussing Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 
243 (1913), and United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913), among other cases). 
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trust lands, individual allotments, and, to a more limited degree, 
opened lands that had not yet been claimed by non-Indians.”59 
 In 1948, however, Congress clarified the somewhat muddled case 
law on the subject by providing a more expansive statutory definition of 
Indian country.60 Under this controlling law, “Indian country” includes 
all land within the borders of Indian reservations as well as Indian al-
lotments with continuing Indian titles and “dependent Indian commu-
nities.”61 The 1948 statute is not the last word on the subject; Congress 
defines “Indian country” somewhat more narrowly for purposes of liq-
uor possession and sales.62 This definition was cited by the U.S. Su-
preme Court in 1997, in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, despite the fact that the 
case involved no issues related to intoxicants.63 Nonetheless, the 1948 
definition is widely accepted and used in almost all other contexts.64 
 The statutory definition of Indian country would appear to suggest 
that tribal political jurisdiction can be conferred either by presence 
within reservation boundaries or by tribal land ownership.65 In reality, 
however, tribal jurisdiction has in almost all circumstances been closely 
tied to tribal ownership. As the Court recently put it, “[b]y definition, 
fee land owned by nonmembers has already been removed from the 
tribe’s immediate control[;]” thus “[o]ur cases have made clear that 
once tribal land is converted into fee simple, the tribe loses plenary ju-
risdiction over it.”66 Perhaps the most direct way that land ownership has 
been linked to political control is through the “diminishment” cases, in 
which the Supreme Court has confronted, and occasionally accepted,67 
                                                                                                                      
59 Solem, 465 U.S. at 468. 
60 See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006). 
61 See id. The last category refers primarily to the New Mexico Pueblos, whose land was 
held in fee simple pursuant to titles acquired from the Spanish. See Canby, supra note 41, 
at 131. 
62 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154(c), 1156 (providing that “Indian country” does not include 
“fee-patented lands in non-Indian communities” and “rights-of-way through Indian reser-
vations”). 
63 See 520 U.S. 438, 454 (1997); see also Nancy Thorington, Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction 
over Matters Arising in Indian Country: A Roadmap for Improving Interaction Among Tribal, State 
and Federal Governments, 31 McGeorge L. Rev. 973, 1012 (2000) (discussing the Court’s 
incongruous mention of § 1154(c) and § 1156 in Strate, 520 U.S. at 454). 
64 See Thorington, supra note 63, at 1012 (describing the widespread use of the § 1151 
definition in both civil and criminal contexts). 
65 See 18 U.S.C. § 1151. 
66 Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709, 2719, 
2723 (2008). 
67 See South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 357 (1998) (finding congres-
sional intent to diminish a Yankton Sioux Reservation by approximately forty percent, and 
noting that predominantly non-Indian “demographics signify a diminished reservation”). 
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the argument that certain acts of allotment were designed to effect 
changes in the reservation’s political boundaries and not merely the 
ownership status of the land involved.68 
 At the same time, tribal ownership is not in itself enough to confer 
jurisdiction, as the Court made clear by adopting a restrictive interpre-
tation of the meaning of “Indian country” in the 2005 case City of 
Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation. In City of Sherrill, the Oneida Nation 
purchased parcels of land within the reservation’s historical borders— 
borders that, although recognized by treaty and protected by federal 
statute, had long been ignored by New York State.69 The Oneida, who 
ran various businesses on the land, argued that the parcels constituted 
Indian country and were therefore not subject to property tax.70 Re-
versing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Supreme 
Court disagreed, relying on principles of laches to find that the long 
tradition of governance of the parcels by New York State created “justi-
fiable expectations” that trumped both the Indian country statute and 
the Oneida’s ancestral claims on the land.71 City of Sherrill is notable for 
extinguishing a potential upside of the ownership requirement: the 
idea that tribes could expand their jurisdiction by purchasing lands 
they had once inhabited. 
 After City of Sherrill, therefore, tribes are subject in effect to a joint 
requirement of ownership and traditional political control. The effect 
of this requirement is to create a somewhat restrictive form of sover-
eignty, particularly in light of the manifold policies pursued by the 
United States at various times aimed at divesting tribes of their land. It 
is also an unusual interpretation of sovereignty as we normally under-
stand it. We assume that California will have some ability to regulate, 
for example, events taking place on a parcel of land owned by an Ore-
gonian, so long as that parcel is located within California. Likewise, 
perhaps even more obviously, the sale of state-owned lands to an out-of-
state private citizen would not have the effect of shrinking California’s 
borders. But as the previous discussion has suggested, at various times 
both of these principles have been in doubt when it comes to tribal au-
                                                                                                                      
68 See, e.g., Solem, 465 U.S. at 471–72 (explaining that the Court may be more likely to 
find diminishment “[w]here non-Indian settlers flooded into the opened portion of a res-
ervation and the area has long since lost its Indian character,” but holding that, in the 
absence of clear congressional intent, the portion of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reserva-
tion opened to non-Indian settlement had not been diminished). 
69 See 544 U.S. 197, 202, 204–05 (2005). 
70 See id. at 211. 
71 See id. at 214–17. 
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thority and reservation borders. The jurisdictional problems created by 
this interpretation are said to stem from the “checkerboard” nature of 
reservations—the fact that most reservations incorporate pockets of 
non-Indian fee land in the midst of tribal trust or Indian-owned land.72 
This “checkerboard” status, however, is significant only if one attaches 
importance to the ownership status of land in the first instance.73 
 Nonetheless, although hardly an ideal basis on which to establish 
sovereignty, the linkage of ownership and political control at least re-
tains for tribes some elements of traditional territorial sovereignty. As 
long as a large part of the reservation does consist of tribal land— par-
ticularly significant areas such as roads, civic buildings, and community 
gathering places—the tribe can claim meaningful authority over the 
geographical areas that are most important to it. Further, even after City 
of Sherrill, there remains the hope that the tribe can ultimately expand 
its jurisdictional reach by, for example, seeking to have new land placed 
into trust under 25 U.S.C. § 465 or by intensifying the tribal character 
of certain areas by limiting access to nonmembers.74 Thus, despite the 
severe limits of the ownership-based view of tribal control, it is in many 
                                                                                                                      
72 Id. at 211, 219. 
73 Although the Court has been unreceptive to arguments that checkerboard jurisdic-
tion deprives tribes of effective political control, it has recognized this effect in other con-
texts. The Court in City of Sherrill noted that a negative consequence of permitting tribes to 
gain jurisdiction over land by purchasing it was that permitting such tribal control had the 
potential to create checkerboard jurisdictional status in what was formerly state-controlled 
land. See id. at 219–20 (“A checkerboard of alternating state and tribal jurisdiction in New 
York State . . . would seriously burden the administration of state and local governments 
and would adversely affect landowners neighboring the tribal patches.”) (internal quota-
tions omitted). In a broader sense, it is difficult to say that the fact that areas of many res-
ervations are occupied predominantly by non-Indians who do not identify with the tribe is 
not legally relevant; the existence of enclaves ethnically and culturally distinct from the 
ostensibly governing sovereign is frequently a source of tension. What is unique to Indian 
country, however, is that the identification and resolution of such tensions is frequently 
couched primarily in terms of land ownership. See, e.g., supra notes 65–68 and accompany-
ing text. 
74 Section 465, part of the Indian Reorganization Act, was aimed at helping tribes 
undo the effects of allotment by increasing their land base. See Padriac I. McCoy, The Land 
Must Hold the People: Native Modes of Territoriality and Contemporary Tribal Justifications for Plac-
ing Land into Trust Through 25 C.F.R. Part 151, 27 Am. Indian L. Rev. 421, 450–51 (2003). It 
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior “to acquire . . . any interest in lands, water rights, 
or surface rights to lands, within or without existing reservations . . . for the purpose of 
providing land for Indians.” 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006). In City of Sherrill, the Court indicated 
that the § 465 process was the proper route for tribes to expand their political borders, 
noting that “Congress has provided a mechanism for the acquisition of lands for tribal 
communities that takes account of the interests of others with stakes in the area’s govern-
ance and well-being.” See 544 U.S. at 220. The significance of this latter practice is de-
scribed later in this Article. See infra notes 341–427 and accompanying text. 
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ways at least compatible with certain traditional trappings of territorial 
sovereignty. 
B. The Shift to Consent and Membership Rationales 
 In the past few decades, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
shifted the ground once again. In a series of cases, the Court has lim-
ited the geographical dimension of tribal sovereignty still further by 
relying primarily on membership status within a tribe rather than the 
ownership status of land in determining who tribes can regulate. Thus, 
the Court has—in an unprecedented act of judicial involvement in an 
area historically left to Congress—notoriously limited tribal sovereignty 
over nonmembers, even those who voluntarily enter tribal lands, in an 
ever-increasing variety of circumstances. 
 This progression began when the U.S. Supreme Court held, in Ol-
iphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, that the tribes lacked criminal jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians, resting on the logic that tribes, following their 
incorporation into the “overriding sovereignty” of the United States, 
possessed only “‘quasi-sovereign’ authority” and were prohibited from 
exercising powers “inconsistent with [this] status.”75 Subsequently, in 
Montana v. United States, the Court extended Oliphant’s holding to the 
civil regulatory context, holding that, with only minor exceptions, 
tribes lacked the power to regulate the activities of nonmembers acting 
on private lands within the reservation.76 In Strate, the Court reached 
the same conclusion with respect to civil adjudication, holding that the 
                                                                                                                      
75 See 435 U.S. at 208, 209. In 1990, in Duro v. Reina, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
tribal sovereignty did not extend to criminal prosecutions against Indians who were not 
members of the tribe. See 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990). Because of the enormous problems 
this decision created for tribal law enforcement—as many reservations have a large 
population of Indian residents who are not technically members of the tribe—Congress 
responded by passing the so-called “Duro fix,” an amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act 
providing that tribal “powers of self-government” include the “inherent power of Indian 
tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.” 
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006); accord Samuel E. Ennis, Note, Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court 
Criminal Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: An Argument for a Statutory Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 
UCLA L. Rev. 553, 563 (2009). The Supreme Court has upheld this provision. See United 
States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004). 
76 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564−66 (1981). Legislative (or regulatory) 
jurisdiction is jurisdiction to regulate someone’s activities directly. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. 
v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 231 (1987)). Adjudicatory 
jurisdiction (also called judicial jurisdiction) is the jurisdiction to hale someone into court. 
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Three Affiliated Tribes lacked adjudicatory jurisdiction over a non-
member defendant acting on a state right-of-way over tribal lands.77 
 Although the reasoning on which these cases initially rested is noto-
riously unclear,78 later cases have justified their results by suggesting that 
tribal jurisdiction over any given individual requires at least some mani-
festation of consent.79 For example, in Duro v. Reina, a 1990 case denying 
tribes criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians—a result later re-
versed by statute80—the Court explained that “[t]he retained sovereignty 
of the tribe is but a recognition of certain additional authority the tribes 
maintain over Indians who consent to be tribal members.”81 In criminal 
proceedings, the Court suggested, the no-jurisdiction-without-consent 
principle was particularly important because tribes are not subject to the 
Bill of Rights,82 and tribal justice systems are “influenced by the unique 
customs, languages, and usages of the tribes they serve.”83 The Court 
emphasized that consent must be explicit, rejecting the notion that im-
plicit consent could be conferred by contacts with the tribe, as it would 
be in cases of state personal jurisdiction.84 
 Although there seems no obvious reason why a consent-based no-
tion of sovereignty should operate differently in the criminal and civil 
contexts, the Court nonetheless appeared for some time to leave room 
for a slightly more expansive notion of tribal civil jurisdiction. The Mon-
tana rule includes two narrow exceptions not present in the criminal 
setting—one for nonmembers who enter into “consensual relation-
ships” with the tribe and another for nonmember conduct that “threat-
ens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic 
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”85 Both exceptions have 
                                                                                                                      
77 See 520 U.S. at 454. 
78 See Philip Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 Harv. L. 
Rev. 431, 433 (2005) (describing case law as “remarkably incoherent”). 
79 See, e.g., Duro, 495 U.S. at 693. 
80 See supra note 75. 
81 495 U.S. at 693. 
82 Note, however, that the vast majority of the Bill of Rights has been made applicable 
to tribes through the Indian Civil Rights Act, which, for instance, specifically provides for a 
writ of habeas corpus to test the legality of imprisionment. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006) 
(constitutional rights); id. § 1303 (habeas corpus). 
83 Duro, 495 U.S. at 693. 
84 See id. at 695 (rejecting a contacts-based approach to tribal jurisdiction). As Philip 
Frickey has noted, the Court’s rejection of a kind of consent that routinely suffices in the 
state context suggests that the Court is not really concerned about the issue at all; rather, it 
simply regards tribes as membership organizations rather than true sovereigns. See Frickey, 
supra note 78, at 479. 
85 450 U.S. at 565, 566. Although such relationships nominally include “commercial deal-
ing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements,” the Supreme Court has in practice suggested 
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been interpreted extremely narrowly, and the first is in many ways only 
a minor variation on the general principle of consent.86 Nonetheless, 
the “political integrity” exception suggests at least some conception of 
tribal sovereignty extending even to those who do not explicitly agree 
to be governed. 
 Further, even apart from these explicit exceptions, Montana and 
Strate nominally left the assumption that ownership confers govern-
ment power intact. Montana involved a tribe’s attempted regulation of 
nonmember fee land,87 and Strate hinged on a finding that a state right-
of-way acquired over tribal land for purposes of a state highway “ren-
der[ed] the 6.59-mile stretch equivalent, for nonmember governance 
purposes, to alienated, non-Indian land.”88 Both cases thus suggested 
that the one circumstance in which tribes might still retain power over 
nonmembers was when the nonmembers’ activities occurred on tribal 
trust lands. 
 Two subsequent cases, however, have at the very least called this 
assumption into question. In the 2001 case Nevada v. Hicks, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that tribal adjudicative jurisdiction did not extend to 
a suit by a Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes member against state officers 
alleged to have improperly searched his property.89 In so holding, the 
Court minimized the importance of land status, stating that “the exis-
tence of tribal ownership is not alone enough to support regulatory ju-
risdiction over nonmembers” and suggesting that all nonmember regu-
lation might be improper unless one of Montana’s limited exceptions 
applies.90 
                                                                                                                      
that only explicit jurisdictional waivers in contracts or leases would suffice. See id. at 565. In 
Strate, for example, the Court held that this exception did not apply even though the defen-
dant was under a contractual relationship with the tribe and doing agreed-upon work on the 
reservation at the time of the events giving rise to the suit. See 520 U.S. at 456–57. 
86 See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2723 (drawing a distinction between sale 
of nonmember land and conduct on nonmember land, and finding that Montana excep-
tions permit regulation only of the latter); Strate, 520 U.S. at 456–59 (articulating a narrow 
view of both Montana exceptions). Indeed, the 1989 case of Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & 
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation may be the sole case in which the Supreme Court has 
found either exception to apply. See 492 U.S. 408, 444 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring); see 
also Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001) (citing this fact and calling Brendale a “minor 
exception” to the general rule prohibiting jurisdiction). 
87 See 450 U.S. at 547. 
88 See 520 U.S. at 454. 
89 See 533 U.S. at 364. 
90 See id. at 360. 
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 Scholars and tribal advocates initially suggested narrow readings of 
Hicks, some of which the opinion’s text may support.91 As the Court 
observed, the case was against state law enforcement authorities and 
concerned an off-reservation crime, potential grounds for distinguish-
ing a scenario in which ordinary state citizens and wholly on-
reservation events were involved.92 Nonetheless, the Court’s most re-
cent pronouncement on the subject in 2008, Plains Commerce Bank v. 
Long Family Land and Cattle Co., sharply limits the scope lower courts 
have for interpreting Hicks.93 Plains Commerce Bank considered the ques-
tion of whether a tribal court could assert jurisdiction over a claim by a 
tribal couple that a non-Indian bank discriminated against them in the 
sale of on-reservation fee land they had previously leased.94 The Court 
held that—despite Montana’s ostensible “consensual relationship” ex-
ception granting tribal courts jurisdiction over nonmembers entering 
into “commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements” 
with the tribe—sales of nonmember-owned land remained beyond 
tribal jurisdiction.95 
 This narrow reading of one of the few bases for tribal nonmember 
regulation left by Montana is itself a sharp blow to tribal sovereignty. 
Also significant, however, is the primary importance the Court put on 
nonmember status. As the Court put it, “[t]his general rule restricts 
tribal authority over nonmember activities taking place on the reserva-
tion, and is particularly strong when the nonmember’s activity occurs 
on land owned in fee simple by non-Indians—what we have called 
‘non-Indian fee land.’”96 Thus, where previous cases had suggested that 
only nonmember activities on nonmember land were presumptively 
exempt from tribal regulation, Plains Commerce Bank now indicates that 
nonmember activities are exempt, period, where nonmember land is 
                                                                                                                      
91 See, e.g., Daan Braveman, Tribal Sovereignty: Them and Us, 82 Or. L. Rev. 75, 95 (2003) 
(“It is possible that Hicks will be read narrowly in the future and applied only in instances 
where the tribe attempts to exercise authority over state officials on tribal land.”). 
92 See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 355. 
93 See Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2720. 
94 Id. at 2714. Notably, the land was formerly owned by the father of one member of 
the couple; the lease arrangements had been negotiated by the couple with the bank as an 
alternative to foreclosure. Id. 
95 See id. at 2720, 2721 (“Montana does not permit Indian tribes to regulate the sale of 
non-Indian fee land.”). The Court reasoned that Montana’s “consensual relationships” 
exception was limited to “activities,” and that land sales did not fall within the category of 
“activities.” See id. at 2721–23. 
96 Id. at 2719. The Court also observed that “tribes do not, as a general matter, possess 
authority over non-Indians who come within their borders.” Id. at 2718 (emphasis added). 
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involved. At least one lower court has already read Plains Commerce Bank 
as dictating an expansive reading of Hicks.97 
 It is beyond question that the line of cases from Oliphant through 
Plains Commerce Bank represents both a severe narrowing of tribal au-
thority and a shift in focus from territory to membership in construing 
limits on tribal power. These cases have raised the specter that, even as 
the Supreme Court has disclaimed any such intention, it increasingly 
treats tribes as something more akin to “private voluntary organiza-
tions”98—or, as Philip Frickey has put it, “ethnocentric Elks Clubs”99— 
than to autonomous sovereigns still possessing most of their historical 
powers. 
 Further, these cases have not merely reduced the scope of tribal 
sovereignty, but have done so in a particular way—by shifting the rele-
vant criterion for the exercise of tribal authority from tribal territory to 
tribal membership. This shift is important not only because it repre-
sents a narrowing of tribes’ traditional powers, but because it means 
that tribal sovereignty is, in a fundamental sense, different from any 
other sort of sovereignty U.S. courts recognize. Indeed, for purposes of 
determining the limits of tribal regulatory or adjudicative jurisdiction 
over nonmembers, the borders of reservations are almost totally irrele-
vant—and, since Hicks and Plains Commerce Bank, the status of the land 
on which relevant events have occurred is only marginally less so. That 
is, it is almost impossible to imagine a scenario in which tribes have any 
increased right to regulate nonmember conduct on fee land simply 
because it took place within reservation boundaries.100 To say the least, 
this is in sharp contrast to general conceptions regarding the regula-
tory and adjudicative jurisdiction of other nations and states.101 
                                                                                                                      
97 See Dolgen Corp., Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, No. 4:08CV22TSL-JCS, 
2008 WL 5381906, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 19, 2008) (concluding that Plains Commerce 
Bank forecloses a narrow reading of Hicks proposed by tribal litigants because it clarifies 
that “Montana applies to Indian and non-Indian land alike”). 
98 See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (“Indian tribes within ‘Indian 
country’ are a good deal more than ‘private, voluntary organizations’ . . . .”); Duro, 495 
U.S. at 688 (“The tribes are, to be sure, a good deal more than private voluntary organiza-
tions, and are aptly described as unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty 
over both their members and their territory.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
99 Frickey, supra note 11, at 80. 
100 The taxation power may be a partial exception. See infra notes 107, 344 and accom-
panying text. 
101 This argument is explored further elsewhere in this Article. See infra notes 218–263 
and accompanying text. 
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C. Increasing State Power in Tribal Territory 
 A related effect of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence 
in the area of tribal sovereignty is to increase the power states have over 
what is nominally tribal territory. That is, as the Court has limited 
tribes’ power over their own lands, it has further lessened the territorial 
integrity of reservations by permitting states some ability to regulate 
within-reservation events. Whereas in 1832 Justice Marshall could pro-
nounce that the Cherokee Nation was “a distinct community, occupying 
its own territory, . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no force,”102 
it is now the case that “[s]tates and tribes have concurrent jurisdiction 
over the same territory.”103 
 The effect of recent cases is thus not only to decrease tribes’ power 
to assert regulatory authority over events and conduct occurring within 
reservation borders but also to provide that, at least in some circum-
stances, state law will fill the void. In Strate, the Court assumed that state 
courts would provide the natural alternative to tribal courts for resolv-
ing disputes involving nonmember defendants.104 Further, the Court 
appeared to assume that state courts would apply state law to such dis-
putes, notwithstanding nonmembers’ substantial reservation-based 
contacts.105 The Supreme Court has also given states some authority to 
assert direct regulatory control over the activities of nonmembers on 
reservations, possibly including Indians who belong to a different tribe 
from that which governs the reservation.106 The Court has, for exam-
ple, permitted states to tax on-reservation sales of cigarettes by tribes to 
nonmembers.107 A federal statute, Public Law 280, gives several states 
with large tribal populations the power to exercise criminal jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                      
102 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 519 (1832). 
103 Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989). 
104 See 520 U.S. at 459 (“[Plaintiff] may pursue her case against A-1 Contractors and 
Stockert in the state forum open to all who sustain injuries on North Dakota’s highway.”). 
105 See id. The author has previously taken issue with this assumption, arguing that 
there is no reason not to apply tribal law to many disputes in state court that involve tribal 
contacts. See Florey, supra note 23, at 1632–33. 
106 See Canby, supra note 41, at 288–89 (noting that the Supreme Court has increas-
ingly focused on the member/nonmember rather than the Indian/non-Indian distinction 
in delineating the respective spheres of tribal and state authority). The general principle 
that states cannot assert direct regulatory authority over the activities of tribe members on 
reservations remains more or less intact. See id. at 292. Nonetheless, states can assert indi-
rect authority over tribe members’ on-reservation conduct by applying state law to cases in 
which tribe members sue nonmember defendants, because states possess virtually exclusive 
jurisdiction over such cases. See infra notes 107–109 and accompanying text. 
107 See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 
134, 190 (1980). 
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over events in Indian country.108 The Court has held that this power 
also encompasses a right by states to apply civil “prohibitory” statutes 
within Indian country’s borders.109 
 The growth in state authority over tribal territory has not always 
increased commensurately with the decline of tribal power.110 Indeed, 
the absence of tribal jurisdiction often creates a simple void in govern-
ing authority; this is frequently the case with criminal prosecutions.111 
Nonetheless, to the extent states have made even modest gains in their 
ability to regulate events in Indian country, tribal territorial integrity 
has been further eroded. When state law applies in Indian country, 
tribes appear less like independent nations and more like a dependent 
subsidiary of the state. Thus, the application of state law on reservations 
creates its own threat to the territorial notion of tribal sovereignty. 
II. Immunity as Sovereignty 
 If the story of tribal territorial jurisdiction is one of the slow and 
almost complete erosion of tribes’ traditional sovereign powers, the 
story of tribal sovereign immunity is a nearly opposite one: one in which 
tribes have fully retained and, in some ways, expanded the sovereign’s 
prerogative to be free from suit. The different progressions of the two 
doctrines are particularly notable because sovereign immunity has long 
been a controversial doctrine in numerous contexts.112 Further, even 
more so than territoriality, it is a European import. Territoriality has 
some basis in intrinsically tribal ideas: although it is true that the West-
phalian notion of territorial sovereignty developed in seventeenth-
century Europe,113 many tribes have their own long-entrenched notions 
of the importance of place to community, and even the earliest treaties 
                                                                                                                      
108 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006). Public Law 280 (“P.L. 280”) per-
mitted five states (California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Washington), with a sixth 
jurisdiction added in 1958 (the then-territory of Alaska), to assume extensive criminal and 
civil adjudicative jurisdiction over Indian country. Id.; see Canby, supra note 41, at 232. The 
Supreme Court has since clarified that the civil jurisdiction granted by P.L. 280 was merely 
adjudicative and not regulatory. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 390 (1976). 
109 See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 (1987). 
110 See Cohen, supra note 17, § 6.04(3) (noting that state authority in Indian country 
remains limited). 
111 See Fields, supra note 2. 
112 Sovereign immunity has been described as an “easy doctrine to attack and hard to 
defend. On its face, it seems clearly inconsistent with democratic government.” See Guy I. 
Seidman, The Origins of Accountability: Everything I Know About the Sovereign’s Immunity, I 
Learned from King Henry III, 49 St. Louis U. L.J. 393, 395 (2005). 
113 See Hans J. Morgenthau & Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations: 
The Struggle for Power and Peace 254 (6th ed. 1985). 
616 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:595 
with tribes involved the concept of setting aside some land on which 
they could exist as at least partially sovereign entities.114 By contrast, the 
U.S. Supreme Court did not articulate clear principles of tribal sover-
eign immunity until the mid-twentieth century.115 
 Why the difference in the Court’s approach to these two facets of 
tribal sovereignty? This Part considers that question, and explores some 
of the consequences of coupling a robust doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity with a weak notion of territorial jurisdiction. 
A. The Origins of Sovereign Immunity Doctrines 
 In European and British law, the idea that sovereigns enjoy immu-
nity from suit under some circumstances is a well-entrenched jurispru-
dential notion, dating back at least to medieval England.116 The earliest 
version of the doctrine concerned only domestic sovereign immunity— 
that is, the idea that the king could not be sued in the courts of his own 
country.117 The origins of this doctrine are debated. It is sometimes said 
to stem from a metaphysical notion of the king’s infallibility, but it may 
have also arisen from the more mundane reality that, because the king 
was the lawmaker and highest judicial authority, there existed no prac-
tical means of challenging the king’s actions in court.118 
 As the doctrine of the monarch’s immunity developed, a parallel 
notion of foreign sovereign immunity—the comity-based principle that 
one sovereign should have protections in the courts of another state 
similar to those it enjoys in its own—began to take hold.119 Today the 
United States recognizes both doctrines—that is, the U.S. government, 
                                                                                                                      
114 See Cohen, supra note 17, § 3.04[2][a] (“Federal law has always recognized and pro-
tected a distinct status for tribal Indians in their own territory.”). 
115 See infra notes 136–142 and accompanying text. 
116 See Seidman, supra note 112, at 434. 
117 See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 415 (1979) (“The King’s immunity rested primarily 
on the structure of the feudal system and secondarily on a fiction that the King could do 
no wrong.”) (describing origins of domestic sovereign immunity). 
118 See David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 
U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 2–5 (1972); see also Seminole Tribe of Fl. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 102–03 
(1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). In dissent, Justice Souter explained the origins of the 
doctrine by noting that: 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity comprises two distinct rules, which are 
not always separately recognized. The one rule holds that the King or the 
Crown, as the font of law, is not bound by the law’s provisions; the other 
provides that the King or Crown, as the font of justice, is not subject to suit in 
its own courts. 
Id. 
119 See Hall, 440 U.S. at 416. 
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U.S. states, and foreign nations all enjoy some degree of immunity in 
U.S. courts.120 
 Although the doctrines of domestic and foreign sovereign immu-
nity appear on their face to provide similar protections and have fol-
lowed parallel courses of development in many respects, they also con-
tain many important differences.121 They differ first in rationale. Many 
rationales for domestic sovereign immunity focus on governmental 
structure. Commentators frequently cite Justice Holmes’s famous “logi-
cal and practical” justification for domestic sovereign immunity—the 
idea that “there can be no legal right as against the authority that 
makes the law on which the right depends.”122 In addition, some schol-
ars have seen domestic sovereign immunity as a protection for the de-
mocratic process, arguing that Congress and state legislatures—not 
courts awarding damages to individual litigants—should make the final 
decision on allocation of damage awards that must be satisfied out of 
taxpayer funds and thus affect government spending priorities.123 By 
contrast, foreign sovereign immunity is grounded not in governmental 
structure but in comity and respect for the dignity of foreign nations.124 
 The two doctrines also differ in scope. Both federal and state sov-
ereign immunity contain an exception for prospective injunctive relief 
against officers of the state who violate existing law.125 The fiction un-
derlying this exception is that such officers are acting ultra vires, beyond 
the scope of their duties as agents of the government, and are therefore 
                                                                                                                      
120 See id. at 415–18 (describing parallel development of the doctrines of domestic and 
foreign immunity in American law). 
121 See Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity’s Penumbras: Common Law, “Accident,” and 
Policy in the Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 765, 769–70 
(2008) (noting that various sovereign immunity doctrines have similarities and have often 
developed in tandem). 
122 See Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). Note, however, that while 
this rationale explains federal sovereign immunity and state immunity from state-law suits, 
it does not address the problem of state sovereign immunity in federal causes of action. 
123 See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 1529, 
1537 n.23 (1992). 
124 In the classic—and, as a matter of U.S. law, foundational—case, The Schooner Ex-
change v. McFaddon, Chief Justice John Marshall thus stated that a foreign sovereign should 
not be “understood as intending to subject himself to a jurisdiction incompatible with his 
dignity.” 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812). Later, the Supreme Court described this 
doctrine as a matter of “grace and comity.” Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 
480, 486 (1983). 
125 See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689 (1949) (fed-
eral context); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 154 (1908) (state context). 
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no longer protected by the government’s immunity.126 Officer suits are 
a broad and vital exception to sovereign immunity, often cited as a key 
protection that ensures that sovereign immunity does not become 
merely a way of sanctioning official lawlessness.127 
 Foreign sovereign immunity, as recognized in the United States, is 
not subject to an equivalent limitation. It does, however, include a pow-
erful exception of its own. Since at least 1952, the United States has 
recognized a distinction between the private and public acts of foreign 
sovereigns, recognizing immunity only for the latter.128 Since 1976, this 
distinction has been codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(“FSIA”), which provides that foreign countries are not immune from 
suits arising out of U.S.-based commercial activity.129 
 Finally, the doctrines differ in the branch of government that has 
primary responsibility for their development. Federal and state sover-
eign immunity originated as common-law doctrines, and are in many 
ways still the province of the judicial branch.130 By contrast, courts have 
taken in some respects a more hands-off approach to foreign sovereign 
immunity, essentially treating it as an outgrowth of foreign policy and 
thus the proper domain of the executive branch.131 
                                                                                                                      
126 See Larson, 337 U.S. at 689. This is, of course, something of an oversimplification of 
a complicated doctrine that has played out in different ways with respect to federal and 
state sovereign immunity. 
127 See, e.g., 17A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure 
§ 4231 (3d ed. 2007) (noting that Ex parte Young “go[es] to the very heart of a federal sys-
tem” and is “one of the three most important decisions the Supreme Court of the United 
States has ever handed down”). 
128 See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689 (2004). This policy, which rep-
resented a change from existing practice, was advocated in a 1952 letter from Acting Legal 
Adviser for the Secretary of State, Jack B. Tate. The so-called “Tate letter” was influential, 
although not universally followed by the State Department or by courts until the enact-
ment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in 1976. See id. at 689–90. 
129 28 U.S.C § 1605(a)(2) (2006). 
130 See Larson, 337 U.S. at 705; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890). To some ex-
tent, the Supreme Court has changed the status quo with respect to state sovereign immu-
nity by finding that a robust notion of state immunity from suit is embedded in the consti-
tutional structure. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728–29 (1999) (describing principles 
of state sovereign immunity as “fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional de-
sign”). Nonetheless, whatever constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity may 
exist is a largely implicit one, and the Court has carved out an active role for itself in de-
termining how far such a principle might extend—by, for example, striking down federal 
legislation that, in the Court’s view, exceeds Congress’s powers to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72 (“We reconfirm that the background principle 
of state sovereign immunity . . . is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the 
suit is an area . . . that is under the exclusive control of the Federal Government.”). 
131 See Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 486 (describing Court’s tradition of “defer[ence] to 
the decisions of the political branches—in particular, those of the Executive Branch—on 
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B. The Development of a Tribal Immunity Doctrine 
 In some respects, tribal immunity is a hybrid of both domestic and 
foreign sovereign immunity doctrines. Just as tribes themselves have 
some characteristics of both foreign nations and U.S. states, tribal im-
munity partakes of some qualities of both foreign and state sovereign 
immunity.132 Courts have suggested resemblances between tribal immu-
nity and each doctrine, but the U.S. Supreme Court has never really 
clarified the doctrinal underpinnings of tribal immunity, opining in-
stead that the doctrine developed “almost by accident.”133 Further, 
unlike state sovereign immunity—which the Supreme Court has, at least 
recently, viewed as a constitutional right enjoyed by states that they re-
tained as part of the constitutional plan134—tribal sovereign immunity 
appears to be without either implicit or explicit basis in the U.S. Consti-
tution.135 
 Despite the murkiness of tribal sovereign immunity’s origins, it has 
a fairly long history of recognition in federal law. The Court did not 
explicitly refer to tribal sovereign immunity until 1919, when it did so 
in passing and in dicta.136 Some scholars have suggested, however, that 
the Court implicitly recognized and relied upon a tribal sovereign im-
munity doctrine much earlier.137 Additionally, in the late nineteenth 
                                                                                                                      
whether to take jurisdiction over actions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumen-
talities”). 
132 See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756, 759 (1988). For 
example, in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., the Court analogized 
tribal immunity to foreign sovereign immunity, in the history of which the Court found 
“instructive” parallels. See id. At the same time, courts have recognized strong doctrinal 
parallels between tribal and state sovereign immunity. See Florey, supra note 121, at 783 
n.105 (describing many similarities between state and tribal immunity, as noted by several 
courts). 
133 See Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 756. 
134 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (describing sovereign immunity as an attribute re-
tained by the states in the plan of the constitution). 
135 See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 756 (distinguishing state sovereign immunity from 
tribal sovereign immunity in part because “tribes were not at the Constitutional Conven-
tion”); see also Struve, supra note 21, at 167 (noting that tribal sovereign immunity does not 
derive from the constitutional text). Struve observes, however, that the Court has expanded 
state sovereign immunity beyond its constitutional basis. See Struve, supra note 21, at 167. 
136 See Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919) (noting that, in the case be-
fore it, “the fundamental obstacle to recovery is not the immunity of a sovereign to suit, 
but the lack of a substantive right to recover”). 
137 See Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362, 374 (1850); see also Struve, supra note 21, at 
148–50 (discussing Parks v. Ross). 
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century, some lower federal courts recognized a tribal sovereign im-
munity doctrine as well.138 
 Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has long linked tribal immunity 
to broader principles of tribal autonomy. The Court’s first extensive 
discussion of the doctrine came in a 1940 case, United States v. U.S. Fidel-
ity & Guaranty Co., in which the Court explicitly held that tribes shared 
fully in ordinary principles of sovereign immunity.139 The Court based 
this holding on the “public policy which exempted the dependent as 
well as the dominant sovereignties from suit without consent,” sup-
ported by the “unusual governmental organization and peculiar prob-
lems” of Indian nations.140 Thus, tribes inherently possessed “immunity 
which was theirs as sovereigns,” subject only to congressional abroga-
tion.141 U.S. Fidelity was thus a broad affirmation of tribal immunity, 
closely tying the doctrine to a robust view of tribal sovereignty.142 
 The Supreme Court continued to explore the immunity-sover-
eignty connection in the still-controversial case Santa Clara Pueblo v. Mar-
tinez.143 In Martinez, the Court held that the Indian Civil Rights Act 
(“ICRA”), in which Congress extended most of the protections of the 
Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment to Indian country, did not 
create a private right of action for enforcement of its provisions against 
the tribe.144 In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied in part on “the 
common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign 
powers” that “Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing.”145 
Although the Court recognized that Congress had the ability to waive 
tribal immunity, it found that such a waiver “must be unequivocally ex-
pressed.”146 Because the ICRA contained no such unequivocal state-
                                                                                                                      
138 See Seielstad, supra note 5, at 689–92 (discussing Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 
F. 372, 373 (8th Cir. 1895), and Adams v. Murphy, 165 F. 304 (8th Cir. 1908)). 
139 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940). 
140 Id. at 512–13. 
141 See id. at 512. 
142 See id. The effect of the case was to permit a collateral attack on a bankruptcy 
judgment against a tribe on the grounds that tribal immunity should have barred the pro-
ceeding in the first instance. See id. at 514. Sovereign immunity aside, this is a questionable 
holding. The majority of authorities hold that the allegedly incorrect resolution of a sover-
eign immunity issue should not override ordinary principles of res judicata. See Florey, 
supra note 121, at 817–19. 
143 See 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). 
144 See id. at 72; see also 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–03 (2006). Among the few provisions omitted 
(in recognition of special tribal cultural and financial factors) were the Second Amend-
ment, the Establishment Clause, and the right to state-appointed counsel. See Martinez, 436 
U.S. at 57 n.8. 
145 Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58. 
146 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
2010] Territoriality, Immunity, & the Construction of Tribal Sovereignty 621 
ment, the Court could not presume congressional intent to abrogate 
tribal immunity.147 
 Martinez involved a challenge under the ICRA’s equal protection 
provisions to the membership rules of the Santa Clara Pueblo, which 
excluded the children of female but not male members who married 
outside the tribe.148 The case raised the difficult—and still much-
debated—question of the extent to which tribes should be required to 
conform to notions of fairness and equality in dominant American le-
gal culture.149 Martinez is thus notable for linking tribal immunity to 
tribal freedom from regulation. In other words, the Santa Clara Pueblo 
were able to maintain a policy that would otherwise potentially run 
afoul of the ICRA because the tribe was not subject to suit in federal 
court.150 Martinez thus made clear that tribal immunity was not simply a 
procedural device designed to spare tribes the burden of court appear-
ances or protect fragile tribal finances from runaway litigation costs.151 
It also had the potential to serve as a substantive protection for tribal 
autonomy. 
C. Immunity in the Context of Current Indian Law 
 In the decades following Martinez, the legal landscape for tribes 
changed significantly. As previously discussed, the U.S. Supreme Court 
began the process of radically narrowing tribes’ sovereignty in almost 
every area of law except immunity.152 Further, as the tribal gaming indus-
try came into being, the volume of transactions between tribes and non-
Indians increased, and so did the occasions for potential suit.153 Tribal 
immunity became controversial, leading to various efforts in Congress to 
place substantial limits on the doctrine, all of which failed.154 Nonethe-
less, the Supreme Court has continued to hold the line on efforts by liti-
                                                                                                                      
147 See id. at 59. 
148 See id. at 51, 52. 
149 See Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 799, 816–20 
(2007) (discussing the scholarship). 
150 See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 59. Note, however, that another important part of the hold-
ing in Martinez was the Court’s conclusion that the ICRA did not create a private right of 
action. In the absence of such a finding, the Court suggested, plaintiffs would have been 
able to sue tribal officers for injunctive relief for ICRA violations under principles analo-
gous to those of Ex parte Young. See id. at 59–61. 
151 See id. at 59. 
152 See supra notes 75–111 and accompanying text. 
153 Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 758. 
154 For a detailed account of these efforts, see Seielstad, supra note 5, at 729–52. 
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gants to limit the scope of sovereign immunity, holding that any restric-
tions on the doctrine are the province of Congress. 
 In 1991, in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi In-
dian Tribe of Oklahoma, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a tribe’s deci-
sion to seek an injunction against the application of a state tax to ciga-
rette sales on tribal lands did not constitute a waiver of its sovereign 
immunity as to the state’s counterclaims for unpaid taxes.155 The Court 
disagreed with the Oklahoma Tax Commission’s claim that “tribal 
business activities such as cigarette sales are now so detached from tra-
ditional tribal interests that the tribal-sovereignty doctrine no longer 
makes sense in this context.”156 
 The question of tribal immunity’s continuing relevance was again 
debated in the 1998 case, Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 
in which the Court was asked to consider whether tribal immunity 
should apply to off-reservation commercial activities.157 Manufacturing 
Technologies (“MT”) attempted to sue the Kiowa Tribe for the balance 
on a promissory note, which had allegedly been executed in Oklahoma 
City—i.e., not on tribal trust land.158 Although no prior Supreme Court 
case had imposed geographical or activity-based limits on tribal sover-
eign immunity’s scope, MT argued that tribal immunity should apply 
only to on-reservation and “governmental” (as opposed to commercial) 
activities.159 This distinction would have mapped a similar exception to 
foreign sovereign immunity as that codified in the FSIA.160 The Court 
rejected this suggestion, holding that “our precedents have not drawn 
these distinctions” and that “tribal immunity is a matter of federal law 
and is not subject to diminution by the States.”161 
 Oklahoma Tax Commission and Kiowa Tribe are the Court’s most re-
cent pronouncements on the tribal immunity subject. There is, how-
ever, a more recent case that is related: in a unanimous 2001 decision, 
the Court held that a tribe waived tribal immunity by agreeing to a 
form arbitration clause in a contract.162 The two cases suggest several 
clear contrasts between the Court’s approach to tribal immunity and its 
treatment of other tribal sovereignty issues. The first striking difference 
                                                                                                                      
155 498 U.S. 505, 509–10 (1991). 
156 Id. at 510. 
157 523 U.S. at 753–54. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 755. 
160 See 28 U.S.C § 1605(a)(2) (2006). 
161 Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 755, 756. 
162 See C&L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 
411, 414 (2001). 
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has to do with geographical scope. In most areas of tribal sovereignty, 
the Court’s approach has been to shrink tribes’ geographical reach, 
confining their power first to tribe-owned areas within reservations, and 
ultimately only to the activities of tribe members within those areas.163 
By contrast, tribal immunity might be fairly described as superterritorial 
as it follows the tribe everywhere: on the reservation as well as off it, in 
commercial activities as well as strictly governmental ones.164 It protects 
tribal activities on the reservation even where state law could otherwise 
encroach on them. As Oklahoma Tax Commission makes clear, for exam-
ple, a state may be able to legally tax some activities on the reservation, 
but that does not mean it can sue to collect those taxes.165 In Kiowa 
Tribe, the Court put the matter bluntly. In arguing for tribal immunity 
restrictions, MT had pointed to case law giving states the power to tax 
and regulate tribal off-reservation conduct.166 The Court, however, 
found these cases inapplicable, observing that “[t]o say substantive state 
laws apply to off-reservation conduct, however, is not to say that a tribe 
no longer enjoys immunity from suit. . . . There is a difference between the 
right to demand compliance with state laws and the means available to enforce 
them.”167 
 Another striking contrast between tribal immunity and other tribal 
sovereignty cases is found in the stance the Court has taken toward 
congressional power. In the line of cases starting with 1978’s Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Court began to intrude on Congress’s tradi-
tional plenary power over Indian affairs, determining that the scope of 
tribal sovereignty was a matter for judicial as well as congressional defi-
nition.168 It is hard to convey how radical a break from past practices 
this approach was; and it is one for which the Court has been widely 
criticized.169 By contrast, despite the many reservations the Court ex-
                                                                                                                      
163 See supra notes 75–101 and accompanying text. 
164 See Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 755. 
165 See 498 U.S. at 514 (discussing Oklahoma’s complaint that the Court’s decisions cu-
mulatively provide it with a “right without any remedy” in the collection of taxes from tribes). 
166 See 523 U.S. at 755. 
167 Id. (emphasis added). 
168 See generally 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
169 See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 11, at 5 (observing that the Court has “undercut” the 
traditional understanding of tribal sovereignty in “fundamental ways”). The zenith of the 
Court’s newfound hands-on approach may have come with the 2004 case of United States v. 
Lara, in which the Court considered the question of whether Congress could statutorily 
reverse Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), the decision depriving tribes of their traditional 
power to prosecute nonmember Indians, by passing a statute affirming the “inherent 
power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over all Indians, including nonmembers.” See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 198 
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pressed in Kiowa Tribe about the wisdom of continuing to immunize 
tribes’ business activities from suit, the Court nonetheless held that the 
matter was entirely within Congress’s hands.170 
 In some ways, tribal sovereign immunity might have seemed a 
more logical area for judicial involvement than matters of tribal juris-
diction and self-government. Tribal sovereign immunity was originally a 
court-created doctrine that was built on the common-law development 
of sovereign immunity in other arenas.171 Nonetheless, the Court chose 
to remain sidelined on matters of tribal immunity while adopting what 
may be fairly called an activist stance in other issues of tribal sover-
eignty.172 
 Various explanations have been proposed for the Court’s hands-off 
approach. Some have suggested that the Court was influenced by the 
                                                                                                                      
(2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006). 
Although the Court ultimately upheld the provision in Lara, it did so by a 5–4 margin—a 
surprisingly narrow majority given that the effect of the statute was simply to restore the 
pre-Duro status quo in an area in which Congress ostensibly has plenary power. See Lara, 
541 U.S. at 210. The issue in Lara was whether the Duro fix represented “delegated federal 
authority” or simply a recognition on the part of Congress of “inherent tribal sovereignty.” 
Id. at 199. If the former, tribal prosecutions of nonmembers would arguably have been 
subject to constitutional restrictions. See id. 
170 See 523 U.S. at 758. In a seemingly gratuitous digression, Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion noted that tribal sovereign doctrine, while now “settled law,” originally had “devel-
oped almost by accident” by judicial over-reading of dicta in Turner v. United States. See Kiowa 
Tribe, 523 U.S. at 756–57; see also Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919). Further, the 
Court suggested that tribal immunity was suspect on policy as well as doctrinal grounds; given 
the extent of tribal commercial ventures, it “extend[ed] beyond what is needed to safeguard 
tribal self-governance,” and had the potential to “harm those who are unaware that they are 
dealing with a tribe, who do not know of tribal immunity, or who have no choice in the mat-
ter, as in the case of tort victims.” Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 758. 
171 See Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 756–57. The Court in Kiowa Tribe supported this reason-
ing with a rather odd analogy to foreign immunity, which “began as a judicial doctrine,” 
but was codified when Congress ultimately passed FSIA to provide “more predictable and 
precise rules.” See id. at 759. This explanation slightly oversimplifies the history of the de-
velopment of foreign sovereign immunity doctrine and overstates the role of the FSIA. 
Prior to the FSIA’s enactment, the Court deferred to the executive branch on the question 
of whether foreign sovereign immunity should be granted in any particular case. See Re-
public of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689 (2004). The executive branch normally 
recommended immunity for friendly sovereigns regardless of the circumstances, despite 
the 1952 “Tate letter” that urged limiting the doctrine to public acts. See id. at 689–90. The 
FSIA thus represented not a decision by the Court to defer to Congress, but a shifting of 
responsibility for setting standards for foreign sovereign immunity from the executive to 
the legislative branch. The comparison to tribal sovereign immunity is therefore somewhat 
inapt, because the executive has never had a role in delineating the extent of the tribal 
immunity that courts recognize. 
172 See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Su-
preme Court in Indian Law, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1573, 1576 (1996) (describing the Court’s “rud-
derless exercise in judicial subjectivism” in the area of tribal sovereignty). 
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fact that, as Kiowa Tribe was decided, Congress was seriously considering 
statutory limitations on tribal sovereign immunity.173 Congress ulti-
mately rejected those limitations, however, and the Court has shown no 
inclination to step in and fill the void.174 A perhaps equally or more 
significant factor may have been the Court’s commitment to the idea of 
immunity as the cornerstone of state sovereignty. Seminole Tribe of Florida 
v. Florida, a well-known case decided two years before Kiowa Tribe, ush-
ered in the Rehnquist Court’s new view of state sovereign immunity 
and congressional power.175 In that case, the Court held that Congress 
had no power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Indian 
Commerce Clause (and, by implication, its other Article I powers).176 
 Seminole Tribe held that Congress could not constitutionally subject 
states to suit by tribes under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.177 
Somewhat ironically, this holding was greatly harmful to tribal interests. 
Nonetheless, it may have worked to tribes’ advantage in protecting 
their immunity from judicial incursion. That is, in light of the aggres-
sive limitations the Court has placed on most aspects of tribal sover-
eignty, many commentators have argued that a principal reason the 
Court has been reluctant to restrict sovereign immunity in the tribal 
arena is that to do so might undermine the foundations of its Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence.178 
                                                                                                                      
173 See Seielstad, supra note 5, at 665–66 (“Congress, at the time the Court deliberated 
over and rendered its decision in Kiowa Tribe, was actively reconsidering the [tribal immu-
nity] doctrine, and the Court was aware of this fact.”). 
174 Id. at 666. 
175 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47–62 (1996). 
176 See id. at 47, 62. Subsequent developments have slightly modified this view. In Cen-
tral Virginia City College v. Katz, for example, the Court suggested that the Article I Bank-
ruptcy Clause was “intended . . . to authorize limited subordination of state sovereign im-
munity in the bankruptcy arena.” See 546 U.S. 356, 362–63 (2006). 
177 See 517 U.S. at 47 (“We hold that notwithstanding Congress’ clear intent to abro-
gate the States’ sovereign immunity, the Indian Commerce Clause does not grant Congress 
that power . . . .”). Furthermore, in lumping the Indian Commerce Clause with other Arti-
cle I powers, the Supreme Court ignored a wealth of historical and doctrinal evidence that 
the Indian Commerce Clause gave Congress a distinctive and especially powerful role in 
guiding Indian affairs. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Indian Problem, 59 
Hastings L.J. 579, 611–13 (2008). 
178 See Seielstad, supra note 5, at 762–63. Professor Seielstad explains: 
Even where the Court conveys its reluctance to perpetuate tribal immunity in 
contemporary society, it is compelled to uphold principles that are firmly 
rooted in the historical and jurisprudential fabric of this nation. . . . [T]he 
fact that the tradition of sovereign immunity is rooted in inherent notions of 
sovereignty rather than in the text of a statute or the Constitution may pro-
vide a better explanation for its resilience. 
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 The specific reasoning the Supreme Court has used in the Eleventh 
Amendment context supports this view in many ways. In its state sover-
eign immunity cases, the Court has focused on sovereign immunity as a 
primary and inherent aspect of sovereignty.179 The Court has thus de-
clared that “[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be ame-
nable to the suit of an individual without its consent”180 and that immu-
nity was “a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States 
enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution.”181 Indeed, the 
Court’s Eleventh Amendment cases might be said to depend on a no-
tion of sovereignty and immunity as inextricable, because only by equat-
ing the two has the Court been able to explain how the Constitution 
preserves and enshrines a general principle of state sovereignty despite 
its lack of explicit mention of the doctrine.182 
 In addition to their discussion of the link between sovereignty and 
immunity, the Court’s Eleventh Amendment cases also make clear that 
the Court regards state sovereign immunity as a restriction specifically 
on judicial authority.183 The Court, for example, has viewed state sover-
eign immunity as embodied in Article III (although Article III does not 
directly discuss the doctrine) and thus in a category with other consti-
tutional limitations on the judicial power.184 As a result, the Court has 
retreated to some extent from the judiciary’s historical role in ex-
pounding and developing a sovereign immunity doctrine, instead view-
ing the doctrine as something that courts are powerless to shape or al-
ter.185 
 Read against this backdrop, the Court’s noninterference with im-
munity in the tribal context is in some ways more logical. If all sover-
eigns by definition possess immunity—and, moreover, cannot be di-
                                                                                                                      
Id. 
179 See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 712. 
180 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890)). 
181 Alden, 527 U.S. at 713. Alden v. Maine, in which the Supreme Court held that states 
are immune from suit in their own courts as well as in federal court, was decided about a 
year after Kiowa Tribe. Id. at 712. Nonetheless, it is particularly significant for illustrating 
the way a majority of the Rehnquist Court regarded immunity: as an inextricable part of 
sovereignty that exists whether or not it is formally enshrined in the Constitution or other 
sources of law. See id. 
182 See Seielstad, supra note 5, at 663 (noting that sovereign immunity has come to be 
seen as an index of the degree of sovereignty a particular entity is accorded). 
183 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 64. 
184 See, e.g., id. (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment [stands] for the constitutional principle 
that state sovereign immunity limit[s] the federal courts’ jurisdiction under Article III.”). 
185 See Florey, supra note 121, at 771, 775 (discussing how recently the Supreme Court 
has overlooked sovereign immunity’s origins as a common-law doctrine and regarded it, at 
least in the state context, as a more inflexible constitutional command). 
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vested of it without their clear consent—it makes sense that, no matter 
the degree to which tribal sovereignty has been otherwise eroded, tribal 
immunity would be the one remaining attribute tribes continue to pos-
sess. Furthermore, if state sovereign immunity is a bedrock constitu-
tional principle that specifically limits the power of courts, it seems to 
follow that courts should have a limited role in restricting tribal immu-
nity as well. Thus, even as the Court has been more explicit in drawing 
parallels between tribal and foreign immunity, its state sovereign immu-
nity jurisprudence may have influenced more profoundly the way in 
which it conceives of tribal immunity. 
D. The Boundaries and Effects of Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
 Whatever the explanation for the Court’s hands-off approach in 
the tribal immunity arena, it has had significant practical effects. De-
spite the Court’s expressed reservations about the wisdom of an expan-
sive tribal sovereign immunity doctrine,186 the actual contours of the 
doctrine remain astonishingly broad. The doctrine is arguably broader 
than both state sovereign immunity, which is in practice extensively lim-
ited by waiver, abrogation, and the exception for prospective injunctive 
relief under federal law,187 and foreign sovereign immunity, which does 
not protect commercial acts outside the foreign nation’s territory and 
thus would not have applied to a transaction of the sort in which the 
Kiowa tribe engaged.188 Furthermore, tribal sovereign immunity applies 
not just broadly but deeply, frequently protecting not just tribal gov-
ernments, but tribal entities and corporations that are considered sub-
entities of the tribe.189 Some courts have even found tribal immunity to 
                                                                                                                      
186 See supra note 170. 
187 See Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Who’s Afraid of the Eleventh Amendment? The Lim-
ited Impact of the Court’s Sovereign Immunity Rulings, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 213, 216, 250, 255, 
256 (2006) (arguing that exceptions to state sovereign immunity and alternative means of 
enforcing federal law blunt the impact of the Court’s Eleventh Amendment rulings). Al-
though in theory tribal immunity is subject to some of the same checks as state sovereign 
immunity, in practice they are often less effective in the tribal context. For example, Con-
gress has unlimited power to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity, but it has exercised this 
power sparingly. See Cohen, supra note 17, § 7.05(b) (describing the very limited circum-
stances in which Congress has abrogated tribal sovereign immunity under the Indian Civil 
Rights Act and Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, and noting that Congress has rejected 
broader limits on tribal immunity); see also infra notes 278–281 and accompanying text 
(describing limits of injunctive relief and waiver in the tribal context). 
188 See Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 488. 
189 See, e.g., Ramey Constr. Co., Inc. v. Apache Tribe of the Mescalero Reservation, 673 
F.2d 315, 320 (10th Cir. 1982) (finding that tribal resort was “clothed with the sovereign 
immunity of the Tribe”). Note also that tribal immunity shields tribes from suits by states, 
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apply to individual tribal employees, from managers to maintenance 
workers, when they are acting in the course of their duties for an im-
mune tribal corporation.190 
 Tribal immunity is, of course, of more than symbolic importance. 
Under current law, tribal immunity serves as a safeguard of tribal sover-
eignty in several practical ways. Perhaps its most obvious function is to 
save tribes litigation costs. State and federal sovereign immunity have 
both been justified on the grounds that they are necessary to protect 
public treasuries.191 To many commentators, however, these rationales 
ring hollow, as it is arguably fairer to spread the costs of compensating 
victims among the public than to force such victims to pay their own 
damages.192 The fragile finances of many tribes, however, give the treas-
ury argument added force in the tribal context.193 One large judgment 
has the potential to threaten the tribe’s existence. Unlike states, most 
tribes do not have a sufficiently large tax base to absorb substantial and 
unexpected costs.194 Furthermore, in contrast to the scenario in which a 
                                                                                                                      
although not by the United States because Congress can authorize the suit. Cohen, supra 
note 17, § 7.05[1][a], at 635. In contrast, states may sue each other notwithstanding state 
sovereign immunity (though state immunity does protect states from suits by tribes). See 
Alden, 527 U.S. at 755. Although state sub-entities may also receive sovereign immunity 
protections, this rule has more important consequences where tribes are concerned, be-
cause it is much rarer for states to engage in the wide range of commercial activities that 
many tribes do. Cf. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 & n.54 (1978) (not-
ing that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar municipal liability). States, of course, do 
run businesses, such as state-run lotteries, to raise revenue in much the same way as tribes 
do. In general, however, states do not engage in the variety and scale of commercial activi-
ties that tribes do, nor do they depend on them as extensively for revenue. 
190 See, e.g., Cook v. AVI Casino Enters., 548 F.3d 718, 727 (9th Cir. 2008) (employees 
were protected by tribal immunity because they acted “in the course and scope of their 
authority as casino employees”); Native Am. Distrib. v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 491 F. 
Supp. 2d 1056, 1071–72 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (concluding that managers of tribal tobacco 
company were immune from suit because allegations were related to their official duties in 
running a tribal enterprise); Romanella v. Hayward, 933 F. Supp. 163, 167–68 (D. Conn. 
1996) (finding tribe members responsible for maintenance of parking lot where accident 
occurred were protected by tribe’s immunity, because alleged negligence “[arose] from 
[defendants’] positions as tribal officials responsible for the maintenance of the parking 
lot”). 
191 See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 
75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1011, 1032–35 (2000) (arguing that suits against states do not 
pose a serious threat to state financial welfare). 
192 For a more detailed version of this argument, see Denise Gilman, Calling the United 
States’ Bluff: How Sovereign Immunity Undermines the United States’ Claim to an Effective Domestic 
Human Rights System, 95 Geo. L.J. 591, 647–48 (2007). 
193 As Angela Riley has argued, many tribes “have struggled with financial solvency and 
have long existed on tiny budgets, operating on poverty-stricken reservations.” Angela 
Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1049, 1109 (2007). 
194 See Struve, supra note 21, at 169. 
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state is sued by one of its citizens, nonmember suits against tribes do not 
simply represent a redistribution of costs from one individual to the lar-
ger community of which that person is a part. Rather, they represent a 
net flow of money out of the tribal community.195 
 The costs to tribes of litigating may be more than monetary. States 
and the federal government are familiar repeat players in the state and 
federal court system, with a dedicated staff of attorneys to serve their 
legal interests. By contrast, tribes may have little or no institutional ex-
perience with the state or federal court system. Tribes, therefore, may 
be at a structural disadvantage when forced to litigate outside their own 
courts. Additionally, if the case concerns issues of general Indian law, a 
loss in state or federal court may create undesirable precedent that may 
harm the interests of other tribes as well. 
 A second important function of tribal immunity is to foster the de-
velopment of tribal courts. The jurisdiction of tribal courts is normally 
limited to tribe members.196 Because tribes lack jurisdiction over off-
reservation claims involving nonmembers, nonmembers can only be 
sued in tribal court by their consent, and nonmember plaintiffs gener-
ally have little reason to file in tribal court voluntarily.197 Selective waiv-
ers of immunity in tribal, but not state or federal, court provide a way 
for tribes to permit claims against them to be heard on their own 
terms. Furthermore, tribal courts themselves are frequently important 
                                                                                                                      
195 See Riley, supra note 193, at 1109 (quoting a tribal judge’s defense of tribal immu-
nity: “Suits against the tribe seeking damages attack the community treasury. This money 
belongs to all the people of the Sauk-Suiattle nation. It must be guarded against the attacks 
of individuals so that it can be used for the good of all in the tribal community.”). Of 
course, one might argue that such an outflow of funds is appropriate because tribes have 
an obligation to compensate those they injure. Nonetheless, the situation is quite different 
from, say, a suit against a state by one of its citizens, which represents a redistribution of 
funds within one political community. 
196 See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. 
197 As previously discussed, tribes also lack jurisdiction over nonmember defendants 
even in suits that concern on-reservation transactions. See supra notes 75–101 and accom-
panying text. However, in one of the few remnants of the Supreme Court’s earlier era of 
favoring tribal autonomy, the opposite is true when non-Indian plaintiffs sue Indian defen-
dants in cases arising from events occurring in Indian country; in such situations, tribal 
courts have exclusive jurisdiction. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 223. Nonetheless, sovereign im-
munity remains a helpful forum-shifting device even when tribes are defendants, because 
Williams applies only to on-reservation transactions. Further, in the several states subject to 
P.L. 280, states have civil jurisdiction even over events occurring in Indian country. See 28 
U.S.C. § 1360 (2006). Finally, tribal defendants who are sued in tribal court may wish to 
assert counterclaims over nonmember plaintiffs, claims over which in the absence of con-
sent the tribal court would lack jurisdiction. 
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institutions in tribal life.198 Permitting tribal judges to hear a variety of 
cases and issues enhances the experience and prestige of the tribal ju-
diciary. By using tribal immunity to funnel cases into tribal courts, 
tribes help to enhance the strength of their own courts and ensure that 
they do not lose out in “competition” with state courts that may be lar-
ger, better funded, and more conveniently located for nonmembers. 
 In addition to these two fairly straightforward mechanisms, tribal 
sovereign immunity also protects tribal interests in a subtler manner. At 
a time when tribes’ autonomy to “make their own laws and be ruled by 
them”199 is increasingly in jeopardy, sovereign immunity permits tribes 
in a very concrete way to avoid the encroachment of state or federal law 
that might otherwise be found to apply. This effect may permit tribes 
more autonomy than they might otherwise enjoy. In the previously dis-
cussed Martinez case, for example, the presence of tribal sovereign im-
munity sharply limited the usefulness of the ICRA to litigants—and, 
consequently, also any real obligation on the part of the tribe, aside 
from perhaps an ethical one, to comply with federal law.200 This result 
was controversial because it left tribes in effect free to ignore constitu-
tional rights and protections if they so chose.201 It is virtually indisput-
able, however, that for better or worse, it also promoted the ability of 
tribes to make decisions autonomously on matters that might otherwise 
be subject to federal law.202 Some courts have held that, whether or not 
federal employment law is applicable to tribes, it cannot be enforced 
against them because there is no evidence of congressional intent to 
abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.203 This, of course, limits the practi-
cal effect of federal law that might otherwise be found to govern tribes. 
 Sovereign immunity also provides tribes more practical advantages 
in more ordinary business and tort disputes. It is this dimension of tribal 
immunity that has proven most controversial. In the 2008 case, Cook v. 
AVI Casino Enterprises, Inc., for example, a plaintiff injured in a motorcy-
                                                                                                                      
198 See, e.g., Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987) (observing that tribal 
courts “play a vital role in tribal self-government”). 
199 The Court famously used this phrase to encapsulate tribal sovereignty in Williams. 
358 U.S. at 220. 
200 See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 72; supra notes 143–151 and accompanying text. 
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Notre Dame L. Rev. 333, 362–63 (2004). 
202 See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 72. 
203 See, e.g., Garcia v. Akwesasne Housing Auth., 268 F.3d 76, 85–86 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“Regardless of whether the substantive norms of the ICRA, the ADEA, and the Age Dis-
crimination Act all apply to tribes, none of the laws abrogates tribal sovereign immunity 
from suit.”). 
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cle collision by an “obviously intoxicated” casino employee sued other 
casino employees under both Arizona and Fort Mojave tribal law for 
alleged negligence in serving the intoxicated driver drinks and driving 
her to her car.204 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, while 
acknowledging the potential unfairness of applying sovereign immunity 
to tribal corporations “competing in the economic mainstream,” none-
theless held that, in accordance with established law, the tribal employ-
ees were immune from suit.205 
 Likewise, Native American Distributing v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., a 
2007 case in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Okla-
homa, involved an intra-tribal business dispute in which a tribe member 
and his tobacco distributing company alleged that the Seneca-Cayuga 
Tobacco Co. (“SCTC”), a tribal enterprise, had breached contracts and 
violated federal antitrust law by giving preferences to favored distribu-
tors and various other actions.206 The plaintiff further claimed that 
SCTC’s managers had misleadingly informed him that SCTC was sub-
ject to an immunity waiver in the tribe’s corporate charter and that an 
additional waiver of immunity was not necessary.207 The district court 
found that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity, rejecting plain-
tiff’s argument that SCTC should be estopped from claiming immunity 
because of its managers’ alleged misrepresentation: “[C]ourts may not 
find a waiver of immunity based on perceived inequities arising from 
the assertion of immunity, or the unique context of a case.”208 Plaintiffs 
argued that the “purpose [of tribal immunity] is not served . . . when a 
sophisticated, multi-million dollar tobacco company cynically uses tribal 
sovereign immunity as a shield to protect itself from prosecution for 
illegal business conduct . . . .”209 While calling this argument “compel-
ling,” the district court nonetheless found that it had “no authority to 
find a waiver of immunity based on policy concerns.”210 
 In contract cases, sovereign immunity issues can in theory be han-
dled by a negotiated waiver. Sophisticated parties who enter into con-
tracts with tribes are usually aware of the need to obtain such a 
                                                                                                                      
204 548 F.3d 718, 720–21 (9th Cir. 2008). 
205 See id. at 725 (noting that plaintiff’s policy arguments “are not without some insight 
but are foreclosed by our precedent”). 
206 491 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1058–59, 1062 (N.D. Okla. 2007). 
207 Id. at 1068–69. 
208 Id. at 1069 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
209 Id. at 1070. 
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waiver.211 Waivers, however, often multiply rather than eliminate sover-
eign immunity litigation as disputes arise over their validity and scope. 
Native American Distributing illustrates one common problem: tribal en-
terprises that are issued a corporate charter from the Department of 
the Interior normally include a “sue and be sued” clause in the char-
ter.212 Such clauses, however, have generally been construed as applying 
only to the corporation, not the tribe as a whole, and as a given tribal 
enterprise may be found to be a division of the tribe itself rather than a 
particular tribal corporation.213 The individuality and complexity of 
many tribal business arrangements often complicates the resolution of 
such issues. Further, not only tribal business partners, but tribes them-
selves may sometimes be unpleasantly surprised by courts’ construction 
of sovereign immunity waivers; some courts have construed waivers 
more broadly than the tribe has maintained it intended.214 
 In addition to the policy goals it serves, tribal immunity is a bar-
gaining chip in business dealing and litigation—one that usually re-
dounds to the advantage of tribes, but can in some cases cause them 
unpleasant surprise. Although an essentially collateral effect of the 
strong tribal immunity doctrine the Supreme Court has continued to 
recognize, this function of tribal immunity has become central to the 
debates about tribal immunity’s role and future.215 
III. Territory, Immunity, and the Fragile  
State of Tribal Sovereignty 
 The preceding Parts have sketched the contours of the current 
doctrine of both tribal territoriality and tribal immunity, and explored 
some of the real-world effects that changes in these doctrines have had. 
This Part now poses the question: what is wrong with the status quo? In 
                                                                                                                      
211 See James K. Kawahara & Michelle LaPena, Indian Country, L.A. Law., Jan. 2006, at 
26, 29 (practitioner’s guide to Indian country transactions describing the need for a waiver 
of sovereign immunity). 
212 See Native Am. Distrib., 491 F. Supp. 2d at 1059. 
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corporation, see Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Thompson, 874 
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immunity. See Cohen, supra note 17, § 4.04[3][a], at 256. 
214 See, e.g., Catskill Dev. v. Park Place Entm’t Corp., 206 F.R.D. 78, 89–90 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (reading waiver of immunity in light of other contractual language to reject narrow 
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other words, if sovereign immunity has filled some of the void left by 
the decreasing importance of traditional territorial components of 
tribal sovereignty, why is this an undesirable outcome? This Part thus 
begins by considering whether territorial sovereignty is a concept that 
has continuing relevance to tribes in the face of both its European ori-
gins and the practical reality of weakening territorial bounds world-
wide.216 It goes on to consider whether immunity can be an acceptable 
substitute for territoriality as a foundation for sovereignty.217 
A. Territoriality and Tribes 
 It goes almost without saying that territoriality is central to sover-
eign power and identity, both in popular conception and in law.218 As 
one international law treatise puts it, sovereignty “is founded upon the 
fact of territory. Without territory, a legal person cannot be a state.”219 
Territory defines the limits of sovereignty; sovereign control over terri-
tory consists of “the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any 
other State, the functions of a State.”220 Further, territoriality is the uni-
fying concept on which other sovereign powers are predicated and by 
which they are explained. Thus, it has long been the case that “funda-
mental legal concepts as sovereignty and jurisdiction can only be com-
prehended in relation to territory.”221 
 Recently, however, cultural and geopolitical changes—from the 
redrawing of national boundaries to the expanded possibilities of bor-
derless community fostered by the Internet—have caused some schol-
ars to consider whether territorial boundaries are, or should be, of de-
creasing significance in law. Paul Schiff Berman, for example, has 
argued that “human behavior and communal groupings are less influ-
enced by territory, even as coercive power tends to remain primarily 
the province of territorially-based sovereigns.”222 Territorial ties, Ber-
man argues, have been weakened by what he calls the “deterritorializa-
tion of effects,” or the consequences of distant events on people’s eve-
                                                                                                                      
216 See infra notes 218–263 and accompanying text. 
217 See infra notes 264–322 and accompanying text. 
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634 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:595 
ryday lives.223 For example, people shop at malls populated mostly by 
national chain stores, and suffer personal bankruptcy as the result of 
global economic events.224 Likewise, people’s most important commu-
nity affiliations may be with political and social institutions, such as 
NGOs or online networks, that cross geographical boundaries.225 
 Some have argued that these developments also serve to weaken 
the significance of territoriality with respect to indigenous peoples.226 
Indeed, the argument goes, because tribes had no role in the elevation 
of territoriality to a cornerstone of sovereignty in Europe, territorial 
sovereignty has always been a poor fit for tribes, and we should there-
fore not excessively mourn its demise. Austen Parrish, for example, has 
argued that the fading of territorial boundaries in various arenas of law 
has in some ways strengthened the position of tribes relative to other 
sovereign entities.227 As Parrish argues, colonization has robbed tribes, 
like other indigenous peoples, of the land they traditionally occu-
pied.228 Furthermore, the European model of the territorial nation-
state is in some respects at odds with traditional tribal forms of social 
and political organization.229 Thus, Parrish claims, the weakening of 
traditional borders—and, in particular, the willingness of many people 
to identify with groups that span the boundaries of various nations— 
may have positive consequences for tribes.230 Tribes may, for example, 
be better able to make their case for autonomy within more traditional 
nation-states and they may have more opportunities to forge alliances 
with transnational organizations.231 
 It certainly may be that some aspects of the decreasing focus on 
boundaries will prove beneficial to tribes, whether helping tribes to 
maintain a closer sense of community with tribe members living off the 
reservation, or enabling tribes to profit from Internet-based businesses 
and advertising. Likewise, in a legal climate in which tribes are under 
                                                                                                                      
223 See id. at 933. 
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231 See id. at 311–12. 
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continual threat of becoming little more than “voluntary organiza-
tions,”232 the worldwide rise of true “voluntary organizations” as legiti-
mate sources of political power can only be good news. This Article, 
however, takes the opposite view: that territorial sovereignty remains of 
prime importance for tribes, perhaps even more so than for other sov-
ereigns, and that the (still fairly modest) decline in global significance of 
the concept does not change that fact.233 
 To begin with, the decline of territoriality in legal doctrine gener-
ally can be overstated. Even Berman, while arguing that traditional no-
tions of territoriality are inadequate to explain the complex transna-
tional affiliations that often exist in the modern world, concedes that 
the ability to enforce law remains rooted in territorial notions of 
power.234 He notes, for example, that groups whose membership spans 
national boundaries are normally able to achieve their ends only by 
lobbying local governments and working with local authorities.235 In 
countless areas of law, factors based on physical location remain rele-
vant even though the precise nature of territoriality may have changed. 
Consider, for example, choice-of-law issues. In the United States until 
the second half of the twentieth century, courts used a system often de-
scribed as rigidly territorial under which the location of the last event 
giving rise to a cause of action would be applied to a dispute.236 Most 
states have now adopted more modern choice-of-law schemes that fre-
quently consider multiple factors, including the location of relevant 
conduct and the domicile of the parties.237 Yet these schemes, too, rely 
almost completely on territorial principles, just of a different sort. That 
is to say, they too depend on connections between events and place. As 
Lea Brilmayer has observed: “Clearly there is no way to formulate a 
choice of law regime other than to found it upon territorial assump-
tions of some sort.”238 
 To think about tribes as wholly nonterritorial entities, then, is to 
deny them full sovereignty in two respects. First, to the extent that sov-
ereigns in general enjoy territorial prerogatives, a wholly nonterritorial 
                                                                                                                      
232 See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975). 
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notion of tribal sovereignty means granting tribes an inherently lesser 
version of sovereignty than that which most states and nations enjoy. 
This would be true even if tribes did not also have powerful cultural 
and historical reasons—as discussed below—for attaching value to 
autonomous control of land. A second and slightly subtler reason is 
that the less tribes possess a version of sovereignty that is widely under-
stood and accepted, the more difficult their relationships with other 
sovereigns will be—something that has the potential in turn to impede 
tribes’ ability to “make their own laws and be ruled by them”239 as 
autonomous nations.240 Because the choice-of-law systems followed by 
most states are rooted in territorial considerations, states may be reluc-
tant to apply tribal law even in circumstances where the tribe has a sub-
stantial connection to the transaction and where the court normally 
would apply the law of a sister state or foreign nation.241 
 Likewise, interjurisdictional cooperation between states and tribes 
in enforcing court orders or responding to crime may be made more 
difficult by the uncertainty surrounding the limits on tribal territorial 
authority. Thus, the absence of clear territorial markers of tribal au-
thority has—in addition to the primary effect of providing tribes with a 
less powerful version of sovereignty in the first instance—the potential 
secondary effect of diminishing tribes’ ability to protect their interests 
vis-à-vis states or other entities that are accustomed to operating in a 
territorial framework. 
 Another way of looking at the issue is to consider the importance of 
territory to tribes as a function of the specific tribal experience within 
the United States. The association between tribes and particular parcels 
of land is, for the most part, arbitrary—determined by the convenience 
of colonizers rather than tribes’ historical land claims or use.242 It is im-
portant to note that this is not, however, universally true—certain tribes, 
such as the Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma, continue to occupy their tradi-
tional land base.243 This does not mean, however, that territoriality is 
therefore irrelevant to tribal sovereignty. Most tribe members, in fact, 
                                                                                                                      
239 See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). 
240 This author has explored this problem in a previous article. See Florey, supra note 
23. 
241 See id. at 1650–76. 
242 See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indige-
nous Peoples’ Claims in International and Comparative Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 189, 
236 (2001) (“Internal administrative boundaries utilized by the larger contemporary state 
[demarcating indigenous lands] may differ greatly from the boundaries ascribed to the 
historic entity . . . .”). 
243 McCoy, supra note 74, at 429. 
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regard the reservation as an integral part of tribal sovereignty and iden-
tity because it symbolizes the promise of tribal community and provides 
a tangible symbol of tribes’ existence apart from non-Indian American 
culture and politics.244 Historically, when the United States has tried to 
reduce tribal power, it has done so by separating tribes from their 
land.245 Conversely, pro-Indian policies have attempted to foster the 
autonomous existence of tribes by establishing clearly delineated physi-
cal spaces, whether reservations or other parts of Indian country.246 
 The notion that territoriality continues to have importance for 
tribes also surfaces in the abundant literature arguing that it is impor-
tant for indigenous peoples to both reaffirm and reinvent European 
conceptions of sovereignty.247 Perry Dane, for example, notes that, 
though tribal sovereignty is in one sense constructed by federal law, 
tribes’ sovereignty in another sense belongs to them: “It would not exist 
if Indians had not fought for it, and lived it.”248 For Dane, a continuing 
emphasis on traditional notions of sovereignty is important for tribes 
because it acknowledges tribes’ separateness and the fact that they pos-
sess rights as communities, not just collections of individuals.249 Padriac 
                                                                                                                      
244 See Frank Pommerscheim, Braid of Feathers: American Indian Law and Con-
temporary Tribal Life 11 (1995). Frank Pommerscheim describes in detail the centrality 
of the reservation to the identity of many tribes. Id. The reservation, he observes, is 
a physical, human, legal, and spiritual reality that embodies the history, dreams, 
and aspirations of Indian people, their communities, and their tribes. It is a 
place that marks the endurance of Indian communities against the onslaught of 
a marauding European society; it is also a place that holds the promise of ful-
fillment. 
Id. As Pommerscheim notes, tribes’ commitment to reservations has a long history; from 
the early nineteenth century, “[t]he need for reservations was the one point on which 
both the tribes and federal government could readily agree.” Id. at 17; see also McCoy, supra 
note 74, at 426–27. 
245 See McCoy, supra note 74, at 447. 
246 See, e.g., Pommerscheim, supra note 244, at 19 (describing allotment as an attack on 
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their land base. See McCoy, supra note 74, at 450–51. 
247 See, e.g., Kingsbury, supra note 242, at 216–19; Leslie Sturgeon, Note, Constructive 
Sovereignty for Indigenous Peoples, 6 Chi. J. Int’l L. 455, 465 (2005). 
248 See Perry Dane, The Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 959, 962 
(1991); see also Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic 
Dependent Nation, 83 Or. L. Rev. 1109, 1111 (2004) (observing that, for many tribe members, 
“‘sovereignty’ is as common and heartfelt a term as ‘rights’ is to most other Americans”). 
249 See Dane, supra note 248, at 967. As Dane argues: 
Sovereignty-talk requires legal systems to step—ever so partially—outside 
themselves. . . . [Sovereignty] is less a grant of freedoms or privileges than the 
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McCoy argues that land, in particular, is vitally significant to tribal sover-
eignty.250 Land is significant because North American tribes have “his-
torically been, and continue to be, a land-based culture.”251 Further, a 
“protected land base” continues to be vital in the continuing survival 
and health of tribal communities.252 For tribes accustomed to regarding 
the reservation as the center of tribal life and identity, the inability to 
control events occurring within tribal borders can, at the very least, be 
demoralizing.253 
 Territorial control is important in more practical senses as well. 
Tribes, after all, do occupy land, and activities that occur on or close to 
tribal territory are thus likely to have far-reaching effects on many 
members of the tribe. Consider the scenario of 2008’s Plains Commerce 
Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle, in which the title to on-reservation 
land long used for a tribal business passed to a non-Indian bank.254 By 
virtue of the bank’s ownership, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
tribe had lost all rights to regulate any future sale of the land, even to 
the extent of prohibiting discrimination against one of its members in 
the sales terms.255 The significance of Plains Commerce Bank, is that a pri-
vate land transaction over which the tribe has no sway could result in 
what is in effect a diminution of the geographical reach of the tribe’s 
authority.256 Such a rule creates a fundamental uncertainty about the 
permanence of tribes’ power to make their own legal rules and dimin-
ishes tribes’ ability to plan for the future.257 
                                                                                                                      
power to define freedoms and privileges. More important, it is the capacity to 
build an order of values and structures to sustain or change those values. . . . 
[H]owever divided, limited, and heterogeneous it is, it is a dynamic, organic 
whole. 
Id. Dane suggests that a somewhat complex understanding of territoriality may be neces-
sary within this vision of sovereignty. Though he argues that “territorial division is in some 
deep sense necessary to the definition of legal orders,” he also suggests that tribes might 
be ill-served by rigid notions of territoriality, and that ideas of tribal sovereignty should be 
flexible enough to encompass notions of overlapping jurisdiction or jurisdiction based on 
categories other than territory. See id. at 978–79. 
250 See McCoy, supra note 74, at 422. 
251 Id. at 424. 
252 See id. 
253 See Pommerscheim, supra note 244, at 18. 
254 See 128 S. Ct. 2709, 2714 (2008). Although the original owner of the land at issue in 
Plains Commerce Bank, Kenneth Long, was a non-Indian (though a long-term resident of the 
reservation who operated a family business there), it is easy to imagine a scenario in which 
Indian-owned land could be similarly “lost” to tribal control. Id. at 2715. 
255 See id. at 2719. 
256 See id. 
257 See id. 
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 Another vivid example is the plight of the Oglala Lakota on the 
Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota, located in the second-poorest 
county in the United States.258 When Chane Coombs, a non-Indian, 
used a house he owned on the reservation as a haven for conducting 
various crimes, including methamphetamine dealing, assault, and traf-
ficking in stolen goods, the tribe was helpless to do anything but order 
Coombs off the reservation, orders he ignored.259 Coombs remained 
on the Pine Ridge Reservation until an off-reservation act of domestic 
violence gave state authorities jurisdiction to prosecute him.260 
 The lack of territorial jurisdiction over nonmembers is just one of 
the problems tribes face in limiting on-reservation criminal activity. 
Tribes, for example, are limited to a maximum one-year sentence even 
against tribe members, which in many cases is not a sufficient deter-
rent.261 But the absence of criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers 
within reservation borders—and the resulting tendency of criminals to 
seek sanctuary on the reservation—is perhaps the most vivid symbol of 
tribes’ helplessness.262 
 For tribes within the borders of the United States, territoriality is 
thus an aspect of sovereignty that is easily understood in non-Indian 
culture, that has strong roots in the history and experience of many 
tribes, and that powerfully affects tribes’ daily existence. Although a 
strong case can be made that tribes should take advantage of the trends 
described by Berman and Parrish to assert their sovereignty in non-
territorial dimensions as well, such nascent and untested forms of po-
litical organization are not a substitute for traditional territorial con-
trol.263 Further, to suggest otherwise would be to ignore the rich and 
particularized relationship that tribes have with the actual land they 
occupy. Thus, territory does and should continue to occupy a central 
place in the development of tribal sovereignty. 
                                                                                                                      
258 See Fields, supra note 2. 
259 See id. 
260 See id. 
261 See id. (quoting ex-girlfriend of tribe member serving one-year sentence after as-
saults and death threats as summing up his situation as follows: “[H]e was fine in jail. He 
got fed three times a day, had a place to sleep and he wasn’t going to be there long.”). 
262 Although U.S. Attorneys have jurisdiction over several enumerated major on-reser-
vation crimes, they often lack resources to prosecute all but the most serious cases. See 
Tweedy, supra note 4, at 691; Fields, supra note 2. 
263 See Berman, supra note 222, at 938–39; Parrish, supra note 226, at 306–07. 
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B. The Effects of Immunity 
 If the absence of territorial sovereignty continues to be a problem 
for tribes, what about sovereign immunity? In some ways, tribal sover-
eign immunity has become a substitute for some features of territorial 
control. As the Supreme Court candidly observed in Kiowa Tribe of Okla-
homa v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., the fact that state law may in 
theory apply to tribes in particular circumstances does not necessarily 
mean that the state has the power to enforce that law against an im-
mune tribe.264 Even as the erosion of tribal territorial sovereignty means 
that state law may sometimes apply to the conduct of tribes within tribal 
territory, the existence of tribal immunity nonetheless limits the circum-
stances under which state law can be effectively asserted.265 Thus, a ro-
bust doctrine of tribal immunity tempers to some extent the erosion of 
tribal power within Indian country. 
 Advocates for tribes understand this, and have forcefully urged 
continued respect for tribal immunity in the face of increasing en-
croachment on other tribal sovereign powers.266 Because the news on 
other tribal sovereignty fronts, at least as far as the Supreme Court is 
concerned, has been unremittingly bleak for the past couple of dec-
ades, immunity offers one of the few arenas in which tribes can assert 
their power. It is thus important to tread carefully in pointing out the 
negative aspects of tribal immunity, because any trend toward increased 
restriction of the doctrine—whether by judicial or congressional ac-
tion—is likely to be a severe blow to what remains of tribal autonomy. 
At the same time, however, immunity is an intensely problematic doc-
trine on which to hang the hat of tribal sovereignty, and sole reliance 
on sovereign immunity as a source of power has the potential to impair 
tribal interests in other regards.267 The following section attempts to 
explain why this is true. 
1. Tribes and General Critiques of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine 
 Sovereign immunity has a long history as a disfavored doctrine. 
Prior to the revival of state sovereign immunity as part of the Rehnquist 
Court’s “new federalism,” sovereign immunity doctrines were—almost 
                                                                                                                      
264 See 523 U.S. 751, 755 (1988). 
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universally—criticized by scholars and interpreted narrowly by courts.268 
As Kenneth Culp Davis put it a half-century ago, “nearly every commen-
tator who considers the subject vigorously asserts that the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity must go.”269 Detractors argue that modern sover-
eign immunity doctrines are based upon a misinterpretation (and over-
extension) of their historical counterparts,270 foster a lack of democratic 
accountability,271 and generally permit state lawlessness.272 
 To be sure, some criticisms of state or federal immunity apply with 
less force to tribes. The fact that Congress has limited powers to abro-
gate state sovereign immunity, for example, arguably makes it more dif-
ficult for the federal government to enforce federal law against states.273 
By contrast, Congress has unlimited power to abrogate tribal sovereign 
immunity, even though it has exercised this power only rarely.274 Like-
wise, as previously noted, the undemocratic elements of sovereign im-
munity may be less troubling in the tribal context, because sovereign 
immunity is used most often to shield tribes against non-Indian litigants 
rather than their own population.275 
  Nonetheless, other criticisms of sovereign immunity apply with 
equal strength where tribes are concerned. Perhaps the most important 
of these is the argument that sovereign immunity in effect allows the 
sovereign to ignore the law at will and leaves tort victims without a rem-
edy.276 In some respects, this argument applies with particular force to 
tribes. To begin with, the nature of many tribal enterprises—casinos 
                                                                                                                      
268 See Florey, supra note 121, at 766 (describing historical view of the doctrine as disfa-
vored). 
269 Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 25.01, at 435 (1st ed. 1958). 
270 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1201, 
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for suits by tribes. See Florey, supra note 121, at 814; Struve, supra note 21, at 171–72. 
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and other recreational establishments that may involve alcohol, large 
crowds, and long-distance drivers—multiply the occasions on which 
serious personal injuries may occur. Moreover, the checks that protect 
victims of injuries caused by a state may not necessarily protect those 
who suffer from tribal negligence.277 For example, both the U.S. Su-
preme Court and lower courts have suggested that an analogy to the Ex 
parte Young doctrine in state immunity exists for tribal immunity, per-
mitting suits for prospective injunctive relief against tribal officials.278 
This situation arises, however, far less frequently in the tribal context. 
By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, there is a large body of law that 
states are bound to follow, and Ex parte Young thus provides a meaning-
ful and important check on state lawlessness.279 By contrast, a much 
smaller body of federal law is specifically applicable to tribes, and there 
are thus many fewer opportunities for plaintiffs suing tribes to benefit 
from the Ex parte Young exception. 
 Similarly, the federal government and many states have extensively 
waived immunity.280 Tribes, on the other hand, may be subject to less 
political pressure to waive immunity and, as a result, vary considerably 
in the degrees to which waivers are available and the terms of those 
waivers.281 
 This argument that tribal immunity has the potential to deny vic-
tims a remedy has been made in skeptical asides by courts that nonethe-
less consider themselves bound to apply tribal sovereign immunity doc-
trine as the Supreme Court has delineated it.282 This critique of tribal 
immunity has also found its way into the popular media. Reporters have 
taken up the plight of non-Indians unable to obtain legal recourse for a 
dizzying array of alleged injuries by tribes and tribal entities: negligence 
                                                                                                                      
277 See infra note 278 and accompanying text. 
278 See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978). In Martinez, for example, 
the Court, determined that tribal officers were not protected by the tribe’s immunity. See id 
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by tribal first responders in seeking medical help for a casino employee 
who collapsed;283 contusions resulting from a hit by a stray garbage 
can;284 making high-interest “payday” loans in violation of state con-
sumer protection laws;285 construction defects in an off-reservation 
home build by an Indian-owned corporation;286 loss of equipment con-
fiscated by a tribe in a business dispute;287 an accident in which a 
woman’s legs were crushed by a heavy gambling machine;288 hidden de-
fects in a fish farm leased from the Seminole Tribe of Florida rendering 
it “impossible to raise fish without extensive and expensive restora-
tion”;289 a car crash resulting from a drunk driver served alcohol by a 
tribal casino while already intoxicated;290 and sexual harassment in 
which a casino employee was allegedly coerced into having sex and then 
fired when she became pregnant.291 The variety of such incidents in it-
self provides a sense of the multiplicity of kinds of encounters that non-
Indians have with modern tribal businesses and enterprises. It also sug-
gests the popular ignorance and dislike of the basic principle that a sov-
ereign—particularly a tribal one—does not need to answer to those it 
has injured. 
 Many articles discussing the subject particularly focus on the fact 
that tort victims were entirely surprised by the unavailability of familiar 
remedies for legal wrongs.292 The Broward Daily Business Review quoted a 
lawyer for a tort plaintiff as saying that the “vast majority of the general 
public have no idea on the limitations about suing [tribes].”293 A Sacra-
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mento Bee article thundered that “[m]ost Californians don’t realize that 
when they enter California Indian territory, they leave many of their 
rights as U.S. citizens at the border.”294 
  Some of the negative tone in press coverage, of course, can be at-
tributed to a general lack of familiarity with the continuing sovereign 
status of tribes and the important functions tribal immunity continues 
to serve. Whatever their biases, however, these stories are significant for 
two reasons. First, they suggest that, whatever the benefits of tribal im-
munity, it also comes at a cost of both perceived and real unfairness to 
tort victims who feel themselves to be left without adequate remedy.295 
The extent of this problem, of course, is debatable. Many tribes provide 
tort victims with remedies of various sorts, ranging from rudimentary 
hearings before the tribal council to comprehensive tribal procedures 
that may be equal or superior to state and federal ones.296 Where tribal 
courts are available as forums to hear disputes, justice for nonmembers 
is certainly achievable; as Bethany Berger has documented, for exam-
ple, nonmembers in Navajo tribal court win approximately half of the 
suits in which they are involved.297 
 Second, whatever the actual merits of tribal remedies, press cover-
age is often negative. For example, a Sacramento Bee article quoted the 
lawyer for several nontribal plaintiffs describing a tribal review process 
as “a joke.”298 The consistently negative tone of news coverage of tribal 
immunity suggests that tribes have, at the least, a perception problem. 
In some ways, the existence of tribal immunity—even when it is waived 
to some degree—may contribute to this problem, because tort victims 
may be skeptical of remedies when they are provided only on the tribe’s 
terms.299 
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 Though the press coverage may be subject to criticisms that it is 
incomplete and unfair, it is nonetheless likely that the problem it 
documents is to some extent real. The very effectiveness of sovereign 
immunity as a litigation tool—in the tribal context as in others—makes 
it inherently subject to abuse, and states have been criticized for deploy-
ing their immunity in unfair or manipulative ways.300 It should hardly 
be surprising that tribes, with a more limited litigation arsenal at their 
disposal, may at times do the same. Because sovereign immunity per-
mits the defendant to determine what remedy will be allowed, it is cer-
tainly conceivable that in many cases the defendant will choose to pro-
vide little or inadequate compensation.301 Moreover, individuals who 
wander into casinos are in a much poorer position to demand advance 
waivers of sovereign immunity than are, say, sophisticated contractors 
who negotiate with states. Thus, even if the problem is exaggerated, it 
seems likely that tribal immunity comes at the cost of many instances of 
individual injustice. 
2. The Future of Tribal Immunity 
 Critiques of tribal immunity are troubling not only because they 
present cases of potential injustice in their own right, but also because 
they highlight the fragility of tribal sovereign immunity as a basis for 
tribal power. Although Congress has so far resisted calls to exercise its 
power to place wholesale limits on tribal immunity, there is no reason 
to believe that this state of affairs will last forever.302 Even in the absence 
of congressional action, it is possible that the Supreme Court will take 
steps to limit the doctrine. In two recent cases, the Court has taken sur-
prisingly broad views of Congress’s powers to abrogate state immunity, 
perhaps indicating that the Court may be retreating slightly from the 
high point of its protection of state sovereign immunity.303 To the ex-
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tent that state and tribal sovereign immunity are linked, this trend sug-
gests possible dangers for tribal immunity as well. 
 The effectiveness of tribal immunity as a litigation tactic has already 
made the doctrine a target in some state courts. In 2006, in Agua Caliente 
Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia’s holding illustrated the high stakes involved in the potential colli-
sion of sovereign immunity and state law.304 In Agua Caliente, the court 
employed rather startling reasoning to conclude that a bipartisan state 
body, the Fair Political Practices Commission, could file suit in Califor-
nia court against the Agua Caliente Band (the “Band”) for alleged non-
compliance with campaign contribution reporting requirements under 
a California statute, the Political Reporting Act (“PRA”).305 The Band, 
relying on seemingly well-established doctrine, argued that it was im-
mune from suit in state court.306 The decision should have been 
straightforward, as there was certainly no suggestion that Congress had 
abrogated the Band’s immunity in this situation.307 Nonetheless, the 
court accepted arguments that to grant the tribe immunity from a state 
action to enforce the PRA would “intrude upon the state’s exercise of its 
reserved power under the federal Constitution’s Tenth Amendment” 
and “interfere with the republican form of government guaranteed to 
the state under . . . the United States Constitution.”308 This argument 
hinged on the notion that tribal immunity was a matter of federal com-
mon law, not tribes’ inherent sovereignty.309 Thus, the court suggested 
that the application of tribal immunity, where it has the effect of thwart-
ing a state’s political autonomy, would in effect be impermissible over-
reaching by the federal government.310 
 Agua Caliente is significant both for explicitly highlighting the po-
tential usefulness of tribal immunity as a device for avoiding state law 
and for showing that, when used for that purpose, tribal immunity has 
its limits. To begin with, Agua Caliente illustrates how tribes are often at 
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the mercy of state courts when it comes to interpretations of sovereign 
immunity.311 Even though the extent of tribal immunity is theoretically 
a federal issue, in most situations it is not a basis for removal to federal 
court because it is generally pleaded as a defense.312 Moreover, the Su-
preme Court certainly cannot police every state court’s resolution of a 
tribal immunity issue. 
 Even if the Supreme Court were to grant certiorari in a case that 
pits tribal immunity against state sovereign prerogatives, the result 
could be a highly undesirable one for tribes. As noted, tribal sovereign 
immunity may have survived this far because of its consistency with the 
Supreme Court’s “new federalism” jurisprudence.313 Agua Caliente, how-
ever, raises the specter of a headlong collision between the two doc-
trines.314 If the Supreme Court were to directly confront the possibility 
that tribes’ immunity might encroach on states’ own political auton-
omy, it is by no means clear that tribes would win the fight. Indeed, the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 1996 holding in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida 
that Congress lacked the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity 
for purposes of furthering tribal sovereignty may provide some clue as 
to the likely outcome in such a situation.315 
 The purpose of this discussion is not to predict the impending 
demise of tribal sovereign immunity. For the most part, the doctrine 
remains robust, and neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has given 
any immediate signals that it is in danger. Rather, the intent is to dem-
onstrate that tribal immunity may be peculiarly vulnerable in a way that 
other traditional sovereigns are not. Territorial sovereignty conforms to 
popular notions of how governments operate and most people’s rou-
tine experiences that, when they travel to a different jurisdiction, dif-
ferent substantive rules may apply. By contrast, sovereign immunity is a 
technical legal doctrine that generally takes laypeople by surprise. Fur-
ther, tribal immunity is fraught with both uncertainty about its reach— 
it is, after all, a power raised only once litigation has already com-
menced—and the potential for individual injustice. As a result, it tends 
to generate both stories of personal unfairness and larger structural 
                                                                                                                      
311 See id. at 1128–30. 
312 Sovereign immunity is generally pleaded under one of the subsections of Rule 12 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Burton, 949 F. Supp. 1546, 
1550 (D. Wyo. 1996) (reviewing pleading practices in various courts). For a case to be re-
movable to federal court, the federal issue must appear on the face of the complaint, not 
as a defense. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153 (1908). 
313 See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
314 See Agua Caliente, 148 P.3d at 1128–30. 
315 See 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996). 
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power struggles with states.316 Both these effects may be potent ammu-
nition for those who are skeptical about the consequences of robust 
tribal sovereignty. 
3. Immunity as a Basis of Sovereignty 
 A final, more subtle issue worth raising about tribal immunity is 
that it is a wholly negative power. It permits the sovereign to stay out of 
court, to avoid expending government funds on litigation, and to skirt 
the consequences of otherwise applicable law. It does not, however, 
convey any affirmative powers. It does not permit tribes to define what 
sort of government they want to have or what standards of conduct they 
believe should apply to those they have dealings with. Further, even as a 
negative power, sovereign immunity has severe limits. Individual tribe 
members generally do not share in the tribe’s immunity unless they are 
tribal employees acting in the course of their employment.317 Likewise, 
a tribe wishing to sue a nonmember will almost always be subject to 
state law.318 
 Despite these qualifications, tribal immunity remains a vital part of 
tribal sovereignty, and it is hard to imagine a world in which it could be 
otherwise.319 By raising questions about the negative effects of the doc-
trine, this Article does not intend to argue that tribal immunity should 
be formally scaled back, either by courts or by Congress. It simply sug-
gests that tribes may be ill-served by a situation in which tribal sover-
eignty—particularly vis-à-vis nonmembers—has become defined almost 
exclusively by tribal immunity. 
 Furthermore, there may be circumstances in which it is not to 
tribes’ advantage to push tribal sovereign immunity to its absolute limit. 
Angela Riley has suggested that “good native governance” might be fos-
tered by tribes’ decision to voluntarily limit and shape the use of tribal 
immunity.320 Tribes might, for example, use their immunity not as a way 
to avoid litigation entirely but as a way to require plaintiffs to sue in 
                                                                                                                      
316 See supra notes 282–294 and accompanying text. 
317 See Cook, 548 F.3d at 727 (tribal immunity protects only tribal employees acting 
within the course of their employment). 
318 This is the case because nearly all suits against nonmembers must be heard in state 
court after Strate and Hicks, and state courts generally apply state law to such disputes. See 
supra notes 77, 86 and accompanying text. 
319 See Pommerscheim, supra note 244, at 42–44. 
320 See Riley, supra note 193, at 1111–13. 
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tribal court as a condition of subjecting themselves to suit.321 Another 
device already used by certain tribes is to create separate businesses that 
are distinct from the tribe and do not share in its immunity. All judg-
ments against such businesses must be satisfied by their own assets, not 
by the tribe’s.322 
 Such voluntary limits on tribal immunity mitigate the doctrine’s 
harsher effects while permitting tribes adequate scope to use the doc-
trine to protect their finances and avoid suits in unfamiliar or un-
friendly courts. If used more widely, such devices could help improve 
tribal sovereign immunity’s perception problem while still helping to 
strengthen tribal sovereign autonomy. 
IV. Directions for the Development of Tribal  
Territorial Sovereignty 
 The preceding Parts have explored the difficulties that the current 
balance of territoriality and immunity pose for the development of a 
strong concept of tribal sovereignty. This Part concludes by arguing 
that there are ways in which tribes can test and ultimately shift that bal-
ance. In particular, this Part argues that, despite the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s massive de-emphasis on territoriality brought about in recent 
years, a few areas of law exist in which territorial borders remain signifi-
cant—perhaps most important among them the tribal right to exclude. 
This Part explores ways in which tribes have used these remnants of 
territoriality to bring about more effective governance, and how they 
can continue do so. It also considers ways in which tribes can—and are 
beginning to—make use of immunity in ways that strengthen rather 
than undermine other sovereign attributes. 
A. Vestiges of Territoriality in Current Law 
 As this Article has explained, the Supreme Court has substantially 
undercut the significance of tribal borders—first by focusing on owner-
ship rather than borders as the measure of tribal power, and more re-
cently by the increasing substitution of tribal membership status for 
both factors.323 Yet this transition is not yet entirely complete. For ex-
                                                                                                                      
321 Many tribes already do some version of this. See, e.g., Kawahara & LaPena, supra 
note 211, at 29 (“A frequent mechanism for addressing prospective dispute resolution is to 
provide for forum selection, such as a waiver of immunity to suits before a tribal court.”). 
322 See Cohen, supra note 17, § 21.02[2], at 1286 (describing tribes’ use of this arrange-
ment). 
323 See supra notes 218–263 and accompanying text. 
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ample, some earlier cases that are still good law, particularly in the area 
of tax and limits of state authority, focus on the significance of bor-
ders.324 Moreover, the Court has recently reaffirmed the existence of 
other territorial rights, such as the right to exclude, even if the precise 
contours of those rights remain unmapped.325 
 A still-important way in which borders have significance is in defin-
ing the limits of state regulatory authority vis-à-vis tribe members. In 
general, states have little authority to apply their laws to tribe members 
engaging in activities on Indian lands. In some cases, the Court has ar-
rived at this conclusion based on principles of preemption—the idea 
that state regulation in particular circumstances may be “incompatible 
with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law.”326 In other 
cases, the Court has limited states’ power over matters of tribal govern-
ance based on more fundamental principles of tribal sovereignty.327 
Under either rationale, the basic doctrine is fairly clear. States have vir-
tually no taxing power over Indians in Indian country: they may not tax 
tribal property (including trust lands or on-reservation fee land owned 
by tribe members), on-reservation vehicles owned by tribe members, or 
income earned by tribe members on the reservation.328 Additionally, 
subject to extremely narrow exceptions, states cannot regulate the ac-
tivities of tribe members in Indian country.329 
 These protections for tribe members acting on the reservation are 
important. As a practical matter, they enable tribes to have a tax base 
and ensure that tribe members are not subject to double taxation. 
More broadly, they promote tribal autonomy, by permitting the tribe to 
set its own standards of conduct for nonmembers and, in a more ab-
stract sense, by helping to foster the sense of the reservation as a dis-
tinct, autonomous community. 
 These rules against state intrusion into on-reservation activities 
are, however, subject to the serious limitation that they do not apply to 
nonmembers.330 That is, nonmembers may under certain circum-
                                                                                                                      
324 See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987); Wil-
liams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). 
325 See infra notes 341–427 and accompanying text. 
326 See Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. at 216 (quoting New Mexico v. Mesca-
lero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983)). 
327 See, e.g., Williams, 358 U.S. at 220. 
328 See Canby, supra note 41, at 264–65. 
329 See id. at 292. 
330 See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 467 (1995) (suggest-
ing that income of nonmember employees of a tribe is subject to state taxation); Washing-
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stances be subject to state taxation on their on-reservation dealings with 
tribes,331 and, conversely, tribes lack power to tax nonmembers on 
within-reservation fee land absent the application of one of the Mon-
tana exceptions.332 Thus, these rules are consistent with the Court’s re-
cent emphasis on membership rather than territorial status. As such, 
they leave untouched tribes’ serious problem of a lack of authority to 
prescribe standards of conduct for nonmembers within their borders. 
 Nevertheless, a possible way for tribes to expand tribal territorial 
control over nonmembers within the existing framework is to expand 
the circumstances under which tribal courts exercise jurisdiction over 
disputes involving nonmembers. To begin with, a rare exception to the 
rule that tribes lack jurisdiction over nonmembers concerns nonmem-
bers acting as plaintiffs. When nonmembers sue tribe members in cases 
arising on the reservation for on-reservation transactions, the rule of 
Williams v. Lee requires the nonmember to sue in tribal court as her ex-
clusive remedy.333 Thus, even under existing law, a nonmember’s deci-
sion to do business on the reservation requires her in effect to accept 
the application of tribal law in the event she is the aggrieved party in a 
dispute.334 
 A modest way of expanding the applicability of tribal law within 
tribal borders is for tribes to bargain with nonmembers to agree to liti-
gate in tribal court in circumstances in which tribes are defendants. 
Tribal immunity can be used as important leverage in this regard: a few 
commentators have suggested, for example, that tribes use their im-
munity as a forum-selection device, requiring all disputes to be heard in 
tribal court as a condition of waiving their immunity.335 Other circum-
stances exist in which it may be in nonmembers’ interests to litigate 
disputes in tribal court. For example, when a tribe member wishes to 
sue a nonmember—a case over which the tribal court would normally 
lack jurisdiction—but the nonmember also would like to counterclaim 
                                                                                                                      
ton v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 160–61 (1980) 
(permitting state to tax tribal cigarette sales to non-Indians). 
331 See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. at 467; Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. at 160–61. 
332 See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 653 (2001) (holding that tribe 
could not tax hotel guests on nonmember fee land within reservation and observing that 
“[a]n Indian tribe’s sovereign power to tax—whatever its derivation—reaches no further 
than tribal land”). 
333 See 358 U.S. at 223. 
334 See id. 
335 See Riley, supra note 193, at 1111–13 (suggesting tribes’ use selective waivers of tribal 
immunity to permit ICRA claims in tribal courts); Struve, supra note 21, at 137 (“This essay 
argues that tribes should use their immunity as a forum-allocation device.”). 
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for an on-reservation transaction—a claim that, under Williams, can 
only be brought in tribal court—the nonmember may agree to the 
tribal court’s jurisdiction rather than be required to litigate claims in 
two different fora.336 
 These devices for expanding tribal court jurisdiction do have their 
limits. Many disputes arising against nonmembers on the reservation 
will involve individual tribe members who do not share in sovereign 
immunity and thus cannot use it as a negotiating tactic. In such tribe 
member-nonmember disputes, it may be relatively rare for the non-
member to agree to litigate in tribal court, particularly in a tort case in 
which the forum cannot be negotiated in advance. Furthermore, all 
these tactics apply only in civil disputes and are of little help to tribes 
confronted with the serious problem of nonmember, on-reservation 
crime. 
 As a result, another possible direction for expanding tribal on-
reservation authority is to encourage the application of tribal law in ap-
propriate circumstances by state and federal courts to disputes arising 
on the reservation. Indeed, because many choice-of-law principles look 
to the place where relevant events occurred, it would be consistent with 
normal practice for state and federal courts to apply tribal law to cases 
arising in Indian country.337 In practice, many nontribal courts have 
been reluctant to apply tribal law because choice-of-law principles tend 
to be highly territorial.338 Nonetheless, some state courts have recently 
been more receptive to arguments that tribal law should apply to events 
that occurred on the reservation.339 Such a shift on the part of state 
courts could have important beneficial effects for the applicability of 
tribal law within tribal borders. Although for most tribes having tribal 
law applied by a state court is a distant second to permitting the dispute 
to be heard in tribal court, nontribal application of tribal law at least 
permits the tribe’s substantive standards of conduct to apply to disputes 
that arise within its borders.340 Thus, it may be useful in fostering respect 
                                                                                                                      
336 Such splitting of a case across courts is generally held to be undesirable as a matter 
of procedural fairness and efficiency. See, e.g., Graham C. Lilly, Making Sense of Nonsense: 
Reforming Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 Ind. L.J. 181, 183 (1998) (noting that Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure policy of resolving an entire case in one court is “rooted in conven-
ience, efficiency, and fairness to the parties”). 
337 See generally Florey, supra note 23. 
338 See id. at 1660–64. 
339 See id. at 1665–69 (describing several cases in which nontribal courts have applied 
tribal law). 
340 See id. 
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among nonmembers for the applicability of tribal law within tribal bor-
ders. 
B. The Right to Exclude 
1. The Origins of the Exclusion Power 
 Perhaps the most powerful territorial attribute tribes still possess is 
the power to exclude undesirables—whether formerly members or 
not—from the reservation. Despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s increas-
ing reluctance to give significance to geographical factors in determin-
ing the reach of a tribe’s power, the Court has frequently alluded to 
tribes’ “traditional and undisputed power to exclude persons . . . from 
tribal lands” as a facet of traditional tribal sovereignty that retains 
force.341 As part of this power, tribal law enforcement authorities may 
“restrain those who disturb public order on the reservation, and if nec-
essary, . . . eject them.”342 The Court has also suggested that a tribe can 
use this power in certain circumstances to exact concessions from 
nonmembers who have voluntary dealings with the tribe. In this way, 
tribes can acquire more regulatory power over nonmembers than 
might otherwise be possible. Tribes have the power, for example, to “set 
conditions on entry to [tribal] land via licensing requirements and 
hunting regulations.”343 Likewise, the Court has linked tribes’ taxing 
power to the power to exclude, noting that such power “may be exer-
cised over . . . nonmembers, so far as such nonmembers may accept 
privileges of trade, residence, etc., to which taxes may be attached as 
conditions.”344 
 The Court has been somewhat unclear about the exact nature and 
source of the right to exclude. Earlier cases speak of the power to ex-
clude as one of the inherent trappings of tribal sovereignty.345 In 1982 
in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, for example, the Supreme Court ex-
plained that “a hallmark of Indian sovereignty is the power to exclude 
                                                                                                                      
341 See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696 (1990). 
342 Id. at 697. 
343 See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709, 2723 
(2008). 
344 Id. (quoting Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. at 153). 
345 McCoy argues that tribes possess greater powers than landowners because tribes 
can form governments that are recognized by the United States and exercise other sover-
eign powers. See McCoy, supra note 74, at 478–79. It is certainly true that, despite the ero-
sion of their sovereignty in recent years, tribes continue to possess elements of sovereignty 
that are recognized by the United States, although increasingly territoriality is a less impor-
tant element of that sovereignty. 
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non-Indians from Indian lands.”346 More recently, however, the Court 
has indicated that the right of exclusion may simply be a byproduct of 
tribal ownership of land. In 1997, in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, for exam-
ple, the Court determined that the right-of-way over tribal land granted 
to the state precluded the tribe from exercising “a landowner’s right to 
occupy and exclude.”347 This view—essentially reducing the tribe’s 
rights to those of an ordinary owner—is consistent with the Court’s re-
duced emphasis on tribes’ inherent sovereignty in recent years.348 This 
is a powerful symbolic distinction. It is not clear, however, what differ-
ence the distinction makes in practice, although in theory a right to 
exclude based solely in landownership might limit the power to ex-
clude with respect to people—whether members or nonmembers— 
owning fee land on the reservation or traveling to the private fee land 
of others.349 
 Several avenues exist for tribes to make use of the right to exclude. 
The more established method might be called the indirect route—in 
other words, relying on the theoretical right to exclude to establish 
conditions on which nonmembers can reside on reservation land.350 In 
at least one case, the Supreme Court has found that such indirect use 
of the right to exclude gave the tribe increased powers to regulate non-
member land.351 A second avenue is the direct use of the right to ex-
clude, through banishment and related devices, as either a punishment 
for crimes or as a way of ridding the reservation of troublemakers.352 In 
recent years, the Supreme Court has appeared to give a stamp of ap-
proval to this practice, and many tribes—increasingly desperate for re-
sources to deal with on-reservation crime—have made use of it.353 
                                                                                                                      
346 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982). Notably, the Court in Merrion concluded that the power 
to tax nonmembers did not derive solely from the right to exclude, but was also an “an 
inherent power necessary to tribal self-government and territorial management.” Id. 
347 520 U.S. 438, 456 (1997); accord Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S 353, 359 (2001) (linking 
ownership status of land to tribe’s right to regulate, although finding that tribes may lack 
power to regulate tribe-owned land in certain circumstances). 
348 See supra notes 75–101 and accompanying text. 
349 At least one court has also found that tribes have potentially heightened powers to 
regulate when they attempt to invoke rights specifically related to the landowner’s—as 
opposed to the sovereign’s—right to exclude. See Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal 
Court, 566 F.3d 842, 850 (9th Cir. 2009); see also infra notes 363–365 and accompanying 
text. 
350 See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes of the Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 421–22 
(1989) (White, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). 
351 See id. at 430–31. 
352 See, e.g., Duro, 495 U.S. at 696. 
353 See, e.g., id. 
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 The indirect approach is perhaps best illustrated in 1989 by Bren-
dale v. Confederated Yakima Indian Nation, in which the U.S. Supreme 
Court found a partial tribal right to regulate nonmembers on the 
grounds that Montana’s “political integrity” exception applied.354 This is 
the sole case in which the Court has found tribal regulation to be justi-
fied by either Montana exception.355 In Brendale, the Court considered 
the Yakima’s right to regulate two parcels owned by nonmembers.356 
The first, owned by nonmember Philip Brendale, was a 160-acre tract in 
a so-called “closed area” of the reservation, heavily forested and open 
only to Yakima Nation members and permittees.357 The second, owned 
by nonmember and non-Indian Stanley Wilkinson, was a 40-acre tract 
“bordered on the north by trust land and on the other three sides by 
fee land,” that was located in a part of the reservation open to visitors, 
close to the reservation’s northern boundary, and that consisted of al-
most half of the fee land.358 
 A plurality of the Court prohibited the Yakima Nation from apply-
ing its zoning laws to the Wilkinson parcel, but permitted Yakima Na-
tion regulation of the Brendale parcel.359 In its limited endorsement of 
tribal regulation, the justices focused on the tight control the tribe had 
exercised over the activities of nonmembers in the area.360 Justice Ste-
vens’s concurrence—which announced the opinion of a highly frac-
tured Court as to the Brendale parcel—found that the presence of 
“logging operations . . . [and Bureau of Indian Affairs] roads” as well as 
“the transfer of ownership of a relatively insignificant amount of land in 
the closed area” had “diminished the Tribe’s power to exclude non-
Indians from that portion of its reservation.”361 Nonetheless, the 
Yakima Nation, “[b]y maintaining the power to exclude nonmembers 
from entering all but a small portion of the closed area” had “preserved 
the power to define the essential character of that area” in order to en-
sure that it remained “an undeveloped refuge of cultural and religious 
significance.”362 
                                                                                                                      
354 Brendale, 492 U.S. at 430–31 (White, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). 
355 See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360 (noting that the Court has not found the exceptions to 
apply elsewhere). 
356 492 U.S. at 417–19 (White, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). 
357 Id. at 417–18, 432–33. Brendale had some Indian ancestry but was not a member of 
the Yakima Nation. Id. at 417. 
358 Id. at 418. 
359 Id. at 419–21, 432–33. 
360 Id. at 441 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
361 Id. 
362 Brendale, 492 U.S. at 441 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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 Lower courts have also focused on the right to exclude in uphold-
ing tribes’ right to regulate in certain circumstances. In 2009, in Elliott v. 
White Mountain Apache Tribal Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit permitted a tribe to assert adjudicative jurisdiction over 
nonmembers for the purpose of enforcing regulations regarding “tres-
passing onto tribal lands, setting a fire without a permit on tribal lands, 
and destroying natural resources on tribal lands.”363 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Ninth Circuit made reference to the exclusion power, 
determining that “[t]respass regulations plainly concern a property 
owner’s right to exclude, and regulations prohibiting destruction of 
natural resources and requiring a fire permit are related to an owner’s 
right to occupy.”364 Elsewhere, the Ninth Circuit has similarly suggested 
that the right to exclude encompasses a host of subsidiary rights, includ-
ing “the rights to determine who may enter the reservation; to define 
the conditions upon which they may enter; to prescribe rules of con-
duct; [and] to expel those who enter the reservation without proper 
authority . . . .”365 
 Cases like Brendale and Elliott raise the intriguing possibility that 
active tribal border control could help tribes not only in controlling the 
circumstances under which nonmembers enter their land but in sup-
porting a broader tribal right to regulate.366 In practice, of course, 
there are likely to be difficulties in carrying out such a policy. Limited 
finances may handicap many tribes from exploring the full possibilities 
of border control.367 Most tribes are unlikely to have the resources to 
police their borders with any consistency, let alone to fight the legal 
battles that may ensue. Further, the livelihoods of many tribes depend 
on the regular flow of nonmembers onto tribal land for gaming or 
tourism; such tribes are unlikely to want any policy that might deter 
nonmember travel. Finally, the notion that the right to exclude may 
enhance tribes’ regulatory powers may rest on a shaky foundation. For 
example, Brendale may be a case without much continuing force, given 
the highly unusual facts and the inability of the Court to reach a clear 
majority rationale.368 
                                                                                                                      
363 566 F.3d 842, 849 (9th Cir. 2009). 
364 Id. at 850. 
365 See Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1976). 
366 See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 415 (White, J., announcing the judgment of the Court); 
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367 See Riley, supra note 193, at 1109. 
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 Despite these serious qualifications, Brendale and similar cases have 
the potential to be useful to tribes in some respects. At a minimum, such 
cases allow for some hope that a tribe’s physical control of land will be-
get regulatory control of that land, suggesting that tribes with the re-
sources to do so should consider limiting, or imposing conditions upon, 
nonmember entry.369 
2. Enhancing the Effectiveness of Banishment and Exclusion Orders 
 In recent years, many tribes have chosen to invoke the right to ex-
clude in the more direct and practical way of removing offenders from 
the reservation.370 Given tribes’ limited abilities to impose orthodox 
criminal sanctions even against tribe members for anything other than 
petty crimes,371 many tribes have used exclusion from tribal lands as a 
punishment for serious offenses—from murder to embezzlement to 
child abuse—committed by tribe members or others residing on the 
reservation.372 
 A main advantage of banishment for tribes is that—unlike other 
sorts of serious criminal sanctions—it has received the tacit approval of 
the U.S. Supreme Court.373 Further, though it may sound exotic, ban-
ishment is far from an exclusively tribal sanction. Some U.S. jurisdic-
tions explicitly permit banishment for certain offenses or as a condition 
of probation.374 The Supreme Court has elsewhere observed that depor-
tation, frequently used punitively in the United States, can be “at times 
the equivalent of banishment or exile.”375 Likewise, commentators have 
noted strong resemblances between banishment and some U.S. laws 
such as anti-gang ordinances or sex offender residency restrictions.376 
                                                                                                                      
369 See id. 
370 See, e.g., Alire v. Jackson, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1125 (D. Or. 1999) (nonmember In-
dian daycare worker excluded after allegedly abusive conduct); see also Patrice H. Kunesh, 
Banishment as a Punishment in Contemporary Tribal Legal Systems, 37 N.M. L. Rev. 85, 85–86 
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374 See Doron Teichmann, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and 
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Gang Members: Circumventing Criminal Due Process Requirements?, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1461 
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 In addition to its prevalence in other countries and societies, ban-
ishment also has the advantage of being a punishment traditionally 
used by many tribes.377 In its traditional form, banishment was a sanc-
tion applied principally to tribe members, usually followed by reinte-
gration into the tribe after a defined period of reflection and rehabili-
tation.378 Banishment has been used against both members and 
nonmembers, and has taken a variety of forms.379 Some banishments, 
for example, are permanent; some are for a defined period; and some 
permit reinstatement provided certain conditions are met, such as res-
titution to the victim.380 Banishment can thus be tailored to the severity 
of the crime and can be a useful device for integrating offenders back 
into the community.381 Banishment can also be a civil sanction—as 
Patrice Kunesh suggests, something akin to a restraining order—for 
everything from vandalism to contempt for a court order.382 Although 
some federal courts have found criminal sanctions of banishment to be 
reviewable under the ICRA’s habeas jurisdiction, at least one federal 
court has held that federal courts lack power under the ICRA to review 
a civil sanction of banishment.383 
 In the decades since Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and Strate, 
many tribes have either adopted banishment ordinances or made new 
use of existing ones in order to deal with persistent offenses such as 
drug dealing or unlawful weapons possession.384 The Mille Lacs tribe in 
Ojibwe, Minnesota, for example, has used banishment to exclude sev-
eral members who had engaged in a persistent pattern of lawlessness, 
including holding up drivers at gunpoint.385 Tribes have also used ban-
                                                                                                                      
(2000); Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex 
Offenders, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 101 (2007). 
377 See Kunesh, supra note 370, at 87–88. 
378 See id. at 115 (“[W]hile banishment and exclusion are indeed punishments for of-
fensive conduct, the intended purpose is to motivate the excluded individual to reform his 
or her conduct and eventually be restored to the community.”). 
379 See id. at 93. 
380 See id. 
381 See Riley, supra note 193, at 1103–04. 
382 See Kunesh, supra note 370, at 93 (analogizing banishment to a restraining order); 
id. at 113–15 (describing various uses of banishment for civil purposes). 
383 See Alire, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 1128. 
384 See Curt Brown, Age-Old Practice Battles a Modern Threat: The Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe 
Has Recently Banished Four Members in an Attempt to Curb Chronic Violence. It Isn’t Alone., Min-
neapolis Star Trib., Oct. 6, 2008, at 1A. 
385 See id. 
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ishment to exclude nonmembers who attempt to bring drugs onto the 
reservation,386 and as a sanction for thefts by casino patrons.387 
 A particularly intriguing use of banishment is as a sanction against 
nonmembers, over whom the tribe ordinarily has little or no criminal 
jurisdiction.388 Unlike banishment of members, which normally occurs 
after a full adjudicative process, the decision to exclude a nonmember 
may be at the discretion of tribal officers or the tribal council.389 
 There are few published decisions in nontribal courts related to 
nonmember banishment, but at least some courts have let such ban-
ishment decisions stand. In 1985, in Hardin v. White Mountain Apache 
Tribe, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a banish-
ment order against Hardin—a nonmember—who had leased land on 
the Apache reservation.390 Following Hardin’s conviction for stealing 
federal property, the tribe permanently expelled him from the reserva-
tion.391 Hardin sued various tribal officials in federal court, arguing that 
such an order was beyond the tribe’s jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit 
found that the order was proper.392 
 The case was, admittedly, an easy one. As someone who had en-
tered into a consensual relationship with a tribe and whose violation of 
federal criminal law threatened the tribe’s “health or welfare,” Hardin 
potentially fell within both Montana exceptions permitting tribal regu-
lation of nonmembers.393 Additionally, the Supreme Court had specifi-
cally affirmed tribes’ right to place conditions on entry, and Hardin 
had “entered the reservation under color of a lease in which the Tribe 
had specifically reserved its power of exclusion.”394 
 In other cases, courts have declined to interfere with tribal ban-
ishment orders under less clear-cut circumstances. In 1999’s Alire v. Jack-
                                                                                                                      
386 See id. (describing drug-related banishment of nonmember by the Bois Forte Band 
of Ojibwe). 
387 See Renee Ruble, Tribes Turning to Banishment as a Tool for Curbing Trouble Resurrected 
Practice Helps Reservations Deal with Gangs, Drugs, Theft, St. Paul Pioneer Press, Dec. 6, 2003, 
at B5. 
388 With the so-called “Duro fix,” Congress restored to tribes modest criminal jurisdic-
tion over nonmember Indians, but tribes still lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians—
and civil jurisdiction, in most cases—against nonmembers. Issues of banishment and 
membership may be linked, since in some cases tribes may unenroll members as part of 
the banishment sanction. See, e.g., Quair v. Sisco, 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 952 (E.D. Cal. 2004). 
389 See Riley, supra note 193, at 1105; see also Alire, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 1125 (non-member 
Indian excluded from reservation by vote of tribal council). 
390 See 779 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1985). 
391 See id. at 478. 
392 See id. at 478, 480. 
393 See id. at 479 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566). 
394 Id. 
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son, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon held that it lacked 
jurisdiction to review a tribe’s decision to banish a nonmember, non-
resident Indian.395 The tribal council had voted to exclude a childcare 
worker accused of child neglect based on provisions in the Warm 
Springs Tribal Code permitting exclusion for breaches of the peace 
and violations of a tribal ordinance, among other grounds.396 In con-
sidering the worker’s challenge to the order under the ICRA’s habeas 
provisions, the district court suggested that federal courts may have 
more limited power to review a banishment action against a nonmem-
ber than one against a member.397 Finding that the order as applied to 
the plaintiff did not constitute a “severe restraint on her liberty,” the 
court noted that “plaintiff has not been stripped of her Indian name, 
her lands, her tribal citizenship, or her tribal membership, nor has she 
been banished from her own Tribe’s reservation or territory.”398 Thus, 
nonmember banishment may not constitute the sort of burden on lib-
erty necessary to trigger federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction under the 
ICRA, giving tribes great latitude to fashion exclusion orders on their 
own terms.399 
 Furthermore, courts have accepted that tribes, in some circum-
stances, may be entitled to use force to enforce a valid exclusion order 
against a nonmember. In 2009’s Coleman v. Duluth Police Department, 
nonmember Coleman—who had had frequent run-ins with Duluth po-
lice and had previously engaged in disruptive behavior at the Fond-du-
Luth Casino—tried to enter the casino and was forcibly ejected and 
later restrained by tribal security guards.400 Coleman then sued the ca-
sino guards, along with various Duluth police officers under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 for violating his Fourth Amendment rights.401 Citing the princi-
ple that tribal officers acting pursuant to tribal authority are not subject 
to individual capacity suits under § 1983, the Magistrate judge for the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota found that the tribal 
officers had acted properly according to tribal procedures and within 
the bounds of the tribe’s rights to exclude.402 As a result, the Magistrate 
judge recommended that the claim against the tribal defendants be 
                                                                                                                      
395 See Alire, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 1128. 
396 See id. at 1125 & n.5. 
397 See id. at 1128–29. 
398 Id. at 1128, 1129 (emphasis added). 
399 See id. 
400 See Coleman v. Duluth Police Dep’t, No. 07-473, 2009 WL 921145, at *4 n.5, *5 (D. 
Minn. Mar. 31, 2009). 
401 See id. at *5. 
402 See id. at *24. 
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dismissed.403 The District Court followed the recommendation and dis-
missed the claims.404 
 The power to exclude—often mentioned by the U.S. Supreme 
Court as a kind of consolation prize for a tribe’s inability to regulate or 
punish more directly—is certainly far from a comprehensive solution to 
tribes’ law enforcement needs on the reservation.405 Nonetheless, 
mechanisms exist for increasing the effectiveness of exclusion orders. 
In cases involving Indians, whether tribe members or not, many tribes 
use the modest criminal jurisdiction they possess to impose penalties 
on violators of exclusion orders.406 The usefulness of exclusion orders 
against nonmembers could be significantly enhanced if tribes had simi-
lar enforcement powers at their disposal where non-Indians are con-
cerned. To some extent, tribes have sought to develop those powers.407 
Bethany Berger details creative ways in which tribal authorities have 
been able to enhance their power to address the immediate law en-
forcement violations of nonmembers, from cross-deputization with 
state police to offering offenders a choice between “accept[ing] tribal 
jurisdiction [or] hav[ing] the matter turned over to the state police.”408 
Nonetheless, tribes have little recourse against nonmembers deter-
mined to flout tribal authority, particularly those who repeatedly return 
to the reservation despite an exclusion order against them.409 
 One option for enhanced enforcement may be the involvement of 
state and federal authorities. Such a practice could be helpful to tribes 
both because nontribal authorities may have more resources available 
to them and because state and federal courts potentially have jurisdic-
tion to impose the full panoply of sanctions available under state and 
federal law against nonmembers. State and federal authorities, how-
ever, have often been reluctant to expend resources in enforcing exclu-
                                                                                                                      
403 See id. at *25. 
404 See id. at *2–3. 
405 See, e.g., Duro, 495 U.S. at 696 (“For felonies such as the murder alleged in this case 
at the outset, federal jurisdiction is in place . . . . The tribes also possess their traditional 
and undisputed power to exclude persons whom they deem to be undesirable from tribal 
lands.”). 
406 See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004). Indeed, United States v. Lara 
stemmed from a prosecution for violation of such an order. Id. 
407 See Berger, supra note 297, at 1048–49. 
408 See id. at 1049 n.7 (describing Berger’s experience as a nonmember receiving 
speeding tickets from tribal police officers). 
409 See, e.g., Ruble, supra note 387. 
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sion orders,410 in some cases expressing concerns that lawbreakers ex-
pelled from the reservation will become problems for the criminal jus-
tice system in surrounding communities.411 
 Overcoming these objections by facilitating government-to-govern-
ment cooperation between tribes and state or local authorities is essen-
tial if tribes are to benefit from the enhanced resources of nontribal 
institutions. In other circumstances, tribes have been able to make such 
partnerships successful.412 Cooperation in enforcing exclusion deci-
sions has a strong basis in existing law: most state and federal courts 
grant either complete or qualified full faith and credit to tribal court 
orders.413 In at least one case, a tribe has argued that state authorities 
were subject to treaty obligations requiring them to respect tribes’ right 
to exclude.414 
 Nonetheless, a fundamental problem in applying full faith and 
credit to exclusion orders involving nonmembers is that the tribal court 
may lack all criminal and civil jurisdiction over them. Therefore, it may 
be difficult for tribes to generate an actual judicial order regarding a 
nonmember exclusion that would be entitled to full faith and credit.415 
An important way, therefore, in which tribes could expand the useful-
ness of exclusion orders is to use the issue of exclusion to test the 
boundaries of current law restricting tribal jurisdiction over nonmem-
bers. A strong argument can be made that a nonmember who engages 
in conduct leading to a tribal exclusion order presents a demonstrated 
threat to the tribe’s safety and welfare, thus falling within Montana’s sec-
ond exception and permitting the tribe to exercise civil jurisdiction over 
                                                                                                                      
410 See id. The United States has occasionally brought actions to prevent other forms of 
unlawful trespass on tribal lands. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hualpai Indians v. Santa Fe 
Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 343 (1941) (suit to enjoin railroad’s trespass on tribal lands). 
411 See Brown, supra note 384. 
412 See, e.g., Carol Tebben, Trifederalism in the Aftermath of Teague: The Interaction of State and 
Tribal Courts in Wisconsin, 26 Am. Indian L. Rev. 177, 188–89 (2001) (describing friendly 
relationships between state and tribal judicial authorities in a Wisconsin county). 
413 See Florey, supra note 23, at 1635 n.34 (summarizing various state policies on full faith 
and credit); see also AT&T Corp. v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 283 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(noting that federal courts “must recognize and enforce tribal court judgments under prin-
ciples of comity” unless the tribal court lacked jurisdiction or did not comply with principles 
of due process) (citing Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
414 See Brown, supra note 384. 
415 See supra note 389 and accompanying text. A somewhat ironic consequence of the 
lack of jurisdiction by tribal courts is that exclusion orders against nonmembers are often 
issued by vote of the tribal council or even by individual officers, thus providing the of-
fender with far less process than a tribal judicial body would grant. 
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the nonmember.416 Acceptance by courts of this argument would help 
to strengthen and expand a rarely invoked Montana exception—a great 
victory for tribes in its own right. Furthermore, such a holding would 
enhance the usefulness of the exclusion power, because court recogni-
tion of clear tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers for adjudicating exclu-
sion issues would enable tribes to generate a judicial order that the tribe 
could then more easily seek to enforce in state or federal court. 
 A final way to exclude nonmembers may be an original proceeding 
in a nontribal court seeking to enforce a tribal ordinance or resolution 
permitting exclusion. In at least one published case, a tribe brought suit 
in federal district court seeking enforcement of a tribal resolution ex-
cluding a nonmember general contractor.417 Though the court denied 
summary judgment on the ground that the defendant could assert a 
defense based on alleged noncompliance with the ICRA,418 it nonethe-
less held that it had jurisdiction to hear the case because the question of 
whether the tribe had the authority to exclude a nonmember presented 
a federal question.419 Thus, in some circumstances, tribes may be able to 
                                                                                                                      
416 A federal court apparently accepted some version of this argument in Moss v. 
Bossman, in which several plaintiffs challenged an ex parte exclusion order issued by the 
Yankton Sioux Tribal Court. See No. CIV 08-4085, 2009 WL 891867, at *2 (D.S.D. Mar. 31, 
2009). The court found that the plaintiffs, apparently nonmembers, had not presented a 
challenge to “the legislative or judicial authority of the Tribe . . . to have jurisdiction over 
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integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.’” Id. at *4 (citing 
Montana, 450 U.S. at 566); see also Penn v. United States, 335 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(finding that ex parte exclusion order directed to a nonmember was facially valid where 
nonmember had involved herself with the tribe by “liv[ing] on the reservation, . . . 
work[ing] for the tribe, [having] a large civil suit against the tribe, and [possessing] vari-
ous other personal and professional ties to the tribe and its members”). Note that the ar-
gument for tribal jurisdiction might be even stronger with respect to nonmembers who 
violate already pending exclusion orders against them, even if the order was issued 
through a tribal resolution process rather than by a court. Thus, tribes might be able to 
assert jurisdiction, at a minimum, over nonmembers who ignore a tribal resolution provid-
ing for exclusion. 
417 See Santa Ynez Band of Mission Indians v. Torres, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1040 (C.D. 
Cal. 2002). 
418 See id. at 1047. 
419 See id. at 1041–42. The court’s jurisdictional holding seems potentially questionable; 
although it seems clear that the defendant could raise federal defenses, did the tribe’s suit 
really present an original federal question? The court relied heavily on a much older 
Ninth Circuit case, in which a tribe sued nonmembers to enforce a tribal ordinance. See id. 
(citing Chilkat Indian Vill. v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469, 1474 (9th Cir. 1989)). In that case, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that such a case lay “on the bounda-
ries of tribal jurisdiction” because: 
[T]he state of the law is such that the heart of the controversy over the claim 
will be the Village’s power, under federal law, to enact its ordinance and apply 
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invoke the resources of nontribal courts by, in effect, asking them to 
take action directly against nonmembers who violate tribal orders. 
3. The Controversial Aspects of Banishment 
 To gain ground as a realistic method of tribal law enforcement, 
however, exclusion orders must overcome the controversy that has at-
tended them—particularly if nontribal authorities are to participate in 
their enforcement. Although, as discussed, both banishment and ana-
logues to banishment are still used in many U.S. jurisdictions, some 
commentators have viewed banishment as an antiquated punishment 
incompatible with modern notions of a liberal society.420 Some critics of 
banishment have also argued that tribes that exclude troublemakers 
are simply exporting their problems to surrounding communities.421 
Furthermore, despite the fact that the Supreme Court itself has indi-
cated that exile from the reservation is an appropriate and permissible 
means of enforcing tribal orders, outside the tribal context the Court 
has suggested that banishment may raise Eighth Amendment issues.422 
Since the ban on cruel and unusual punishment is one of the constitu-
tional guarantees incorporated into the ICRA, this raises the possibility 
that courts could find banishment—particularly if permanent or ac-
companied by a loss of tribal citizenship—to be an ICRA violation.423 
                                                                                                                      
it to non-Indians. . . . Indeed, the meaning of the ordinance is barely open to 
dispute, but the Village’s power under the federal statute or common law to 
enact and apply it is open to immense dispute. 
Chilkat Indian Vill., 870 F.2d at 1474. Note that in theory tribes could also seek enforce-
ment of a tribal exclusion ordinance against a nonmember in state court, because state 
courts have jurisdiction of claims brought by tribe members against nonmembers. See 
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877, 889–
90 (1986). 
420 Chief Justice Warren, for example, once described banishment as a “fate universally 
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tions to banishment). 
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422 See Trop, 356 U.S. at 100; Riley, supra note 193, at 1106 (noting that banishment may 
raise Eighth Amendment issues). 
423 Some banishment decisions, for example, involve sentencing the offender to condi-
tions of physical hardship. Angela Riley describes a case in which two Tlingit teenagers, as 
a punishment for robbery and assault, were “sentenced to a period of exile on separate 
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 Indeed, some courts have already found authority under the ICRA 
to review banishment decisions. Despite the fact that the ICRA nor-
mally only grants habeas jurisdiction to federal courts, some courts 
have found banishment—at least when applied to a tribe member—to 
be both criminal in nature and a sufficient restraint on liberty to permit 
habeas review.424 Although there appears to be no published decision 
in which a court has found that banishment per se violates due process 
or constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, some courts that have 
accepted habeas review have gone on to invalidate particular banish-
ment decisions on the grounds that the tribe failed to provide sufficient 
procedural protections to the offender.425 
 Despite this skepticism about banishment, there is much to be said 
in its defense. When used in certain circumstances and with adequate 
safeguards, banishment can be a reasonable method by which tribes as-
sert control over their territory. Banishment is not, of course, solely 
about territorial control, particularly when applied to tribe members for 
whom—because it potentially represents exclusion from their commu-
nity and livelihood—it can also function as a severe form of punish-
ment. At the same time, however, banishment and other forms of exclu-
sion represent the most basic form of border control and territorial 
security. Exclusion for such offenses as attempting to import drugs onto 
the reservation, for example, bears a strong resemblance to the steps 
nearly all governments take to avoid the smuggling of contraband at 
their borders. 
 Additionally, arguments against exclusion orders are particularly 
weak when nonmembers are involved. Applied to nonmembers, an ex-
clusion sanction is far less severe, as no loss of community ties or politi-
                                                                                                                      
remote islands for one year, where they were expected to survive on their own.” See Riley, 
supra note 193, at 1104. 
424 See, e.g., Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 900–01 (2d Cir. 
1996); Quair, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 971. Although the tribe’s sovereign immunity would nor-
mally have barred suit, courts permitting review of banishment decisions have held that 
sovereign immunity does not apply when tribal officials are sued for alleged violations of 
federal law. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing this exception). Other 
courts have found that exclusion orders are, at least in certain circumstances, not a crimi-
nal sanction and thus do not fall within ICRA’s grant of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Alire, 65 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1127–28. 
425 See, e.g., Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26, 33–34 (D. Ariz. 1969) (holding, in early, 
pre-Martinez case, that banishment of nonmember who engaged in controversial legal 
advocacy was invalid under ICRA because it constituted a restraint on free expression and 
because the exclusion order had not been the result of any judicial process); see also Quair, 
359 F. Supp. 2d at 977–78 (finding triable issues of fact on issues of whether disenrolled 
and banished tribe members were denied due process and a fair trial). 
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cal status is involved (by definition, that is, nonmembers do not fully 
participate in the tribal community). Moreover, where nonmembers 
are concerned, the possibility that tribal governments will use exclusion 
to settle scores or to remove political dissenters—one objection to the 
practice when used against members—is far more remote.426 Finally, 
because tribes have limited options when dealing with nonmembers, 
exclusion cannot be attacked on the basis that a less severe sanction 
would be more appropriate given that tribes generally have no means 
of imposing such a sanction.427 
 On the whole, then, exclusion holds promise for strengthening 
tribal territorial control of lands. Increased use of exclusion—and in-
creased cooperation between tribal and state or federal authorities in 
enforcing exclusion orders—may have collateral benefits for both 
tribes and nonmembers. For nonmembers, the threat of exclusion may 
reinforce the idea that the reservation is a distinct and perhaps even 
foreign place, with its own laws and customs, in which the visitor should 
not necessarily count on precisely the same legal norms that apply at 
home. This heightened awareness would provide tribes with a useful 
deterrent to ensure that nonmembers comply with tribal laws while on 
tribal territory. 
C. Final Suggestions: Borders and Immunity 
 Two final suggestions about strengthening tribal territoriality are 
perhaps the most straightforward. The first is simply for tribes them-
selves to draw more attention to their borders and to offer frequent 
reminders of their sovereign, autonomous status to visitors within In-
dian country. I have already mentioned the variety in tribal border 
signs, some of which are nearly invisible and others of which directly 
proclaim tribes’ sovereign status.428 Other tribes have found more crea-
tive ways to proclaim to nonmembers the tribe’s distinct identity, such 
as the use of tribal language within the reservation or on signs pointing 
to it. The Crow and other tribes in Montana, for example, have success-
fully lobbied to have tribal words placed on state highway exit signs.429 
Likewise, Cahuilla artist Gerald Clark has created various road signs in 
                                                                                                                      
426 See Riley, supra note 193, at 1108. 
427 See Fields, supra note 2. 
428 See supra notes 31−34 and accompanying text. 
429 See Becky Bohrer, Tribal Words Highlight Exit Signs, Billings Gazette, Apr. 23, 2006; 
see also Joanna Brooks, Samson Occom at the Mohegan Sun: Finding History at a New England 
Indian Casino, 4 Common-Place: The Interactive J. of Early Am. Life 4, at P. I (2004) 
(showing sign greeting visitors in Mohegan and English). 
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the Cahuilla language, designed to be posted on the property of family 
and friends on the Cahuilla Reservation, that are intended to reinforce 
traditional Cahuilla identity.430 Popular destinations such as casinos or 
resorts are logical places for tribes to use signs to emphasize their sov-
ereign status or the necessity of compliance with tribal rules. 
 Such measures might seem trivial, but their role goes beyond sym-
bolism. Many objections to subjecting nonmembers to tribal law center, 
at their core, on lack of notice: the law governing tribes is obscure, 
complicated, and little-publicized.431 Nonmembers entering a reserva-
tion—in contrast to Americans crossing the border into Mexico or 
Canada—may not be aware of the full extent of tribal sovereignty, the 
possibility that different laws may apply, or the fact that claims against 
the tribe or tribal corporations may be barred by sovereign immunity.432 
Nonmembers’ potential surprise may be used as a justification for re-
stricting tribal territorial sovereignty still further.433 Thus, prominent 
proclamation of the tribe’s right to govern particular land both de-
creases the possibility that nonmembers will be subject to unfair sur-
prise and enables tribes to better argue that tribal law should apply in a 
broader array of circumstances. It is unclear whether this argument 
would find a receptive audience in the Supreme Court, as the Court 
has already held, at least in the criminal context, that warning signs to 
nonmembers cannot create implied consent to criminal jurisdiction.434 
It nonetheless could help to change the popular notion of tribal sover-
eignty in ways that might ultimately resonate in legal doctrine. 
 The second suggestion is, in some ways, closely tied to the first. It 
calls for tribes to use sovereign immunity less as a separate source of 
power from territoriality and more as a tool for enhancing territorial 
control. As other commentators have suggested, one way for tribes to 
do so is to waive immunity from suit in tribal court routinely, thus fun-
neling more on-reservation suits into tribal court where tribal law can 
                                                                                                                      
430 See Gerald Clarke, Artist, Cahuilla Installation: NESUN E’ELQUISH (2001), http:// 
hanksville.org/artists/GClarke/Photoalbum/pages/nesun-sign_jpg.htm. Unfortunately, some 
of the signs have been vandalized (last visited May 3, 2010). See id. http://hanksville.org/ 
artists/GClarke/Photoalbum/pages/netaxmuqa-sign_jpg.htm (last visited May 3, 2010). 
431 See Pommersheim, supra note 244, at 36–57. 
432 See supra notes 283–295 and accompanying text. 
433 See Strate, 520 U.S. at 441 (suggesting potential burden in requiring nonmember 
defendants “to defend against this commonplace state highway accident claim in an unfa-
miliar court”). 
434 See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 193 n.2 (“Notices were placed in prominent places at the 
entrances to the Port Madison Reservation informing the public that entry onto the Res-
ervation would be deemed implied consent to the criminal jurisdiction of the Suquamish 
tribal court.”). It is possible that similar signs may carry more weight in the civil context. 
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be applied to them.435 Also, if tribes were to create more visual remind-
ers of their sovereign status for visitors within reservation borders, they 
could thereby bring about heightened awareness of tribal immunity by 
reminding visitors to be on notice of the possibility that different legal 
principles may apply to transactions in Indian country.436 Thus, height-
ened awareness of tribal territoriality could have the welcome side ef-
fect of reinforcing the message to nonmembers that, in their dealings 
with tribes, they—like travelers to foreign jurisdictions generally—bear 
the burden of acquainting themselves with tribal rules. 
Conclusion 
 Tribal sovereignty remains—as it has always been—under con-
struction. Tribes’ ambiguous status within the United States has often 
meant that traditional notions of sovereign power may not necessarily 
apply. In recent years, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken a 
sharp turn toward completely severing the link between tribal power 
and tribal territory. In the process, it has done tribes a disservice, and 
one that has not been adequately remedied by permitting tribes to pre-
serve the often-problematic right of immunity from suit. 
 Although tribes cannot undo the damage the Court has done, 
avenues remain by which tribes can reinforce and perhaps ultimately 
expand the territorial powers they continue to possess. Tribes can be 
vigilant in protecting their right to control the activities of tribe mem-
bers within tribal land. They can advocate for state and federal courts 
to apply tribal law to events within tribal borders. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, they can make creative use of the exclusion power, both to ex-
pand their practical control over nonmembers and to nudge Supreme 
Court case law in more favorable directions. Regardless, tribes can 
make use of their sovereign immunity in ways that are both responsible 
to those they injure and advantageous to the tribes’ own interests. In 
this way, immunity can serve to enhance tribal territoriality rather than 
simply constituting a weak substitute for it. 
                                                                                                                      
435 See supra note 321 and accompanying text. 
436 In reality, of course, tribal immunity applies to all dealings with the tribe, whether 
on-reservation or off-reservation. In practice, however, legal disputes between tribes and 
nonmembers are overwhelmingly likely to arise on the reservation, particularly when they 
involve unsophisticated nonmembers most likely to be surprised by the operation of tribal 
immunity. Certainly most recorded disputes (both in the media and in case law) bear this 
out. See, e.g., supra notes 283–294 and accompanying text. 
